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The aim of this thesis is to analyse the connections between comedy and 
metafiction evident in Flann O’Brien’s At Swim-Two-Birds, The Third Policeman and 
The Hard Life. The following pages discuss how these novels express, utilize, subvert 
and explode typical comic discourse within a postmodern paradigm. As works that 
contain numerous ontological levels that confuse a reader’s sense of reality, that 
foregound their status as art and that take the subject of writing itself as a theme. At 
Swim-Two-Birds, The Third Policeman and The Hard Life all explode traditional modes 
of representation in general, and the conventional comic vision in particular.
Throughout my discussion, I describe and apply theories of laughter (namely, the 
Incongruity, Superiority and Relief theories) to help describe how the humorous aspects 
of O’Brien’s work disrupt the reading process and the reader’s expectations o f order and 
comfort. I also interrogate other comic/humour devices within O’Brien’s works — such 
as pirns, which crack language to let words bleed a variety of meanings, and thus reflect 
how language is implicit in generating multiple levels of fluid reality.
My rhetorical pattern for this thesis consists of analysing the way O’Brien handles 
the mixing of the comic and metafiction from novel to novel — that is, I chart a 
progession from the more obvious (At Swim-Two-Birds) to the more subtle (The Third 
Policeman) to the well-hidden but certainly still evident and important (The Hard Life). I 
show how O’Brien’s subversion of comic discourse creates a vision of a chaotic, plural 
reality that is both playful and dark.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
© 1998 Chris Yurkoski
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
U1
For Mom and Dad, 
in thanks for all o f their support; 
the financial kind, 
the editorial kind, 
and the just plain, old-fashioned love and encouragement kind.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
IV
“In reply to an inquiry, it was explained that a satisfactory novel should be a self-evident 
sham to which the reader could regulate at will the degee o f his credulity.”
Flarm O’Brien, At Swim-Two-Birds
“Perhaps it is only a game.”
John Fowles, The French Lieutenant’s Woman
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Chapter One: Introduction
Comedy is a literary mode that has, traditionally, seemed desperately at odds with 
itself. While containing internal disruptions at the levels o f language, narration and story 
that threaten the possibility of closure and stability both for the characters specifically and 
for the meaning-establishing task of language in general, the comic pattern is also famous 
for the employment of happy endings that attempt to erase all earlier disruptions. But 
such traditional, and paradoxical, notions of what constitutes comedy are being untangled 
and subverted by twentieth-century writers such as Irish novelist Flann O’Brien.
Comedy, in Flann O’Brien’s At Swim-Two-Birds, The Third Policeman and The Hard 
Life, is not a discourse whose purpose is to test social and literary status quos only to 
confirm them — it is more like a battlegound on which traditional literary formats and 
comfortable readerly expectations are blown apart.
Contemporary comedies such as O’Brien’s are very much metafictional novels — 
that is, literary works that lay bare the processes involved in the creation of meaning 
through story-telling, and that take the art of story-telling itself as a theme by 
foregoimding the artifice involved in the fiction-making process. Such works represent 
“fiction about fiction — that is, fiction that includes within itself a commentary on its own 
narrative and/or linguistic identity” (Narcissistic Narrative 1) and “fiction whose primary 
concern is to express the novelist’s vision of experience by exploring the process of its 
own making” (Christensen 11). Metafiction, according to Robert Scholes, “assimilates
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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all the perspectives of criticism into the fictional process itself’ (114). Brian McHale also 
suggests, more specifically, that metafiction showcases the way in which our perception 
o f the author as an omnipotent, God-like creator and ruler has changed in contemporary 
literature. These days, the author “makes his freedom visible by thrusting himself into the 
foregound of his work...represent[ing] himself in the act of making his fictional world” 
(30).
Metafiction falls within the realm of “postmodernism” — a category o f literature 
that, according to McHale, includes works of fiction that are less concerned with the 
problems of epistemology (“problems o f knowing"' (10)) that characterize modernism, 
than with ontological problems (“problems of modes o f being’' (10)). McHale says that 
typical postmodernist questions bear either on the ontology of the literary 
text itself or on the ontology of the world which it projects, for instance: 
What is a world?; What kinds of worlds are there, how are they 
constituted, and how do they differ?; What happens when different kinds 
of worlds are placed in confrontation, or when boundaries between worlds 
are violated?; What is the mode of existence of a text, and what is the 
mode of existence of the world (or worlds) it projects?; How is a projected 
world structured? (10)
Metafictional works express how worlds are projected, examine “the ontology of the 
literary text itself,” and deal with “boundaries” being “violated.”
It is this latter characteristic, the violation of ontological boundaries, that 
underlines the complementary nature of comic literature and metafiction. For instance.
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critic T.G.A. Nelson suggests how
it is clear that the comedy of many times and places has successfully 
exploited techniques for teasing, cajoling or disorienting readers and 
auditors, for exchanging back-chat with them, and even for drawing them 
into the performance. It has played tricks based on illusion, it has made a 
joke out of the tenuousness of the grasp human beings have on reality. It 
has turned the world upside down. Metafictional techniques, which lend 
themselves to such procedures, are, for that reason, peculiarly suited for 
comedy. (151-152)
Comedies, according to what Nelson says, seem to demonstrate a built-in 
metafictional tic in the form o f a “potentially disruptive force of laughter” that is “at odds 
with the movement of the comic fable towards reconciliation, harmony and acceptance of 
the world” (179). Since “laughter is often discordant, malicious, or vindictive,” Nelson 
says, “it can disrupt harmony rather than promoting it” (2) — the new realities brought 
into being by jokes, parodies etc. show just how tenuous our notion of a “stable reality” 
is. This idea of reconciliation is, according to Nelson (quoting Helen Gardner) of the 
utmost importance in traditional comedies: ‘“ [t]he geat symbol of pure comedy...is 
marriage, by which the world is renewed, and its endings are always instinct with fresh 
beginnings. Its rhythm is the rhythm of the life of mankind, which goes on and renews 
itself as the life of nature does” (41).
In traditional comedies, then, reconciliation and closure should generally win out 
over disruption. The metafictional tic should remain nothing more than that. According
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to L.J. Potts (as quoted by Nelson) ‘“ the popular view of comedy in England is no doubt 
based on a sentimental response to As You Like //...and other Shakespearean plays’” (41) 
which end with positive conclusions, such as a marriage, that serve to reinforce the 
present and future stability and coherence of the world to the reader.
O’Brien’s comedies seem to disregard and undermine the traditional comic 
pattern where
[t]he normal action is the effort o f a yoimg man to get possession o f a 
young woman who is kept from him by various social barriers: her low 
birth, his minority or shortage of funds, parental opposition, the prior 
claims of a rival. These are eventually circumvented, and the comedy ends 
at a point where a new society is crystallized, usually by the marriage or 
betrothal of hero and heroine. The birth of the new society is symbolized 
by a closing festive scene featuring a wedding, a banquet or a dance. This 
conclusion is normally accompanied by some change of heart on the part 
of those who have been obstructing the comic resolution. (Frye 72-73) 
Thus do O’Brien’s novels work against “[t]he action of a Shakespearean comedy [that] is 
not simply cyclical but dialectical as well: the renewing power of the final action lifts us 
into a higher world, and separates that world from the world of the comic action itself’ 
(Frye 133). Neither do O’Brien’s novels illustrate “[t]he mythical or primitive basis of 
comedy [that] is a movement toward the rebirth and renewal of the powers of nature, this 
aspect of literary comedy being expressed in the imagery more directly than in the 
structure” (Frye 119). O’Brien frequently ironizes such a movement and, by neglecting to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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finish with a festival and marnage that showcases “the birth of a new society,” suggests 
that human consciousness cannot return to the higher, focused world humanity was 
expelled from after the Biblical Fall.
In fact, the comic subject in O’Brien’s novels is not so much a young man as 
comic discourse itself — i.e. the comic pattern and thematic implications suggested by that 
pattern. While there may be disruptions that threaten or undermine a character’s 
movement towards some sort of reconciliation in O’Brien’s work, each novel’s focus 
seems to be on disruptions to language and authority that subvert the comic pattern in and 
o f itself. Where the main character/narrator does not experience any series o f dramatic 
dilemmas similar to those “various social barriers” Frye mentions, in novels such as At 
Swim-Two-Birds, comic discourse itself still has a number of dilemmas to overcome in 
order to keep itself stabilized.
Postmodem metafictional comedies like O’Brien’s, then, are driven by a dissonant 
rhythm — one based in a fallen world where humanity has been alienated fi-om the cycles 
of nature. Thus, more recent comedies showcase a mode more representative of chaos 
than harmony. Nelson writes of how it is the “absence of consummation [that] is 
characteristic of modem comedy: plays and novels end inconclusively or in a ridiculous, 
undignified death” (169). I will discuss how O’Brien’s comic novels do make a “joke out 
of the tenuousness of the grasp human beings have on reality” through structures that blur 
the boundary between life and fiction, blur the lines of worlds within fiction and remain 
quite inconclusive by not necessarily sweeping characters back to their respective 
ontological levels, or resolving these multiple worlds into one by novel’s end. O’Brien’s
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metafictional comedies certainly avoid the kind o f closed, ‘happy-ever-after’ ending that 
is the comedy writer’s traditional stock-in-trade. They are, in fact, characterized by and 
given their strength through the lack of entirely neat reconciliatory endings that would tie 
all loose ends up together into a single bundle o f neat reality. O’Brien exposes how 
contrived such a tying-together is; how reality cannot be so easily domesticated.
In this context, it is important to recall the traditional idea of the novel as a form 
of mimetic art. McHale suggests that “postmodernist fiction does hold up [a] mirror to 
reality” (39) — however, that “reality” is not an easily-represented one, but one that “now 
more than ever before, is plural” (39). In this thesis, I will certainly try to demonstrate 
that novels such as O’Brien’s contain “ontological poetics” that “[pluralize] the “real” 
and... [problematize] representation” (McHale 75).
While satire, according to Leonard Feinberg, is a “playfully critical distortion of 
the familiar” (19), it should not be confused with traditional notions of comedy. “Satire 
is permeated with disapprobation, complaint, expose, denunciation, rebuke, [and] 
condemnation” while “[c]omedy is also critical; but comedy ends in a conciliatory mood, 
having resolved the conflict and pretended that things will be better in the future” (59). 
Still, if satire “ridicules man’s naive acceptance o f individuals and institutions at face 
value” and exposes “the contrast between reality and pretense” (Feinberg 3), then we can 
see a satiric bent within O’Brien’s novels — where he ridicules traditional notions o f a 
static reality and of traditional comic works that suggest “things will be better in the 
future.”
A consideration of a more extreme attack on literature can be found in Patrick
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O’Neill’s discussion of “entropie comedy” and “entropie parody.” In O’Neill’s terms, 
parody does not seem to merely involve one literary work mocking another easily 
identifiable one, such as Joyce’s Ulysses parodying Homer’s The Odyssey (although 
parodies create disorder themselves through changing elements of a parodied work ,̂4 
Theory o f Parody 32)) so much as works that mock the fiction-making process itself to 
create disorder at the level of meaning-creation and authorial control.
O’Neill bases his theories on the scientific notion of entropy, which “is predicated 
on the erosion of certainty” and “order developing] irreversibly into chaos” (O’Neill 
299). O’Neill says that “[e]ntropic comedy may be defined as the expression — literary or 
otherwise — of a form of humour whose primary characteristic is its own awareness of its 
status as decentred discourse” (xiii) and the works that he goups together as entropie 
comedies, then, can be seen as novels so disordered that they have no one central over­
riding authority to hold them together into stable meaning.
Such disordering and decentring is expressed by “entropie parody,” which is 
“metalaughter, a comedy of discourse” (135), a “comedy of comedy itself’ (136). In such 
a context the ultimate purpose o f jokes (such as puns or even parodies themselves) is not 
just to create a humorous situation in a novel but to destabilize discourse and point to the 
fictional framework. While normal parody may simply be “concerned with 
intertextuality, with the relationship between texts” (O’Neill 138), entropie parody deals 
with the mechanics of novels and the relationship of these mechanics to the material they 
transmit to the reader. Entropie parody represents a “comedy o f narration, discourse, 
structuration, fiction, making” (138) and can describe a comic work that does not come
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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back together at its conclusion in the traditional comic mode. In his study of Alain 
Robbe-Grillet’s La maison de rendez-vous, O’Neill describes that novel as containing “ a 
parody of narrative, a subversion of narrative writing” (270), and while O’Brien certainly 
utilizes parody to such a disordering effect with regards to traditional fictional works, he 
also does so with specific regards to the processes of traditional comic narratives.
Such “entropie comedies” are so decentred that they have no definable authority, 
as O’Neill suggests with his examination of Nabokov’s Pale Fire, a book in which
we never gain any conclusive footing, any Archimedean point of leverage 
in the shifting sands of the narrative...The reader is constantly challenged 
to establish the relative validity of the conflicting authorial voices in the 
text to create an authorial and authoritative voice, and in the end can only 
admit the impossibility o f the task. Reality is no longer accessible, for in 
the end all is appearance only, the play o f artifice, and the butterfly 
possibility of difference. (294)
Linda Hutcheon’s ideas on parody are also applicable to O’Brien’s comedies. In 
A Theory o f Parody, she notes that metafictions “rework...discourses whose weight has 
become tyrannical” (72) and that “[pjarody,” in such a context, “can also be seen...to be a 
threatening, even anarchic force...that puts into question the legitimacy of other texts” 
(75). While parody ‘“ disrealizes and dethrones literary norms’” its “transgessions 
remain ultimately authorized — authorized by the very norm it seeks to subvert” (75). 
“Even in mocking,” she suggests, “parody reinforces; in formal terms, it inscribes the 
mocked conventions onto itself, thereby guaranteeing their continued existence”
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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(Hutcheon 75). She suggests that since “[pjarodic art both deviates from an aesthetic 
norm and includes that norm within itself as backgounded material” then “[a]ny real 
attack would be self-destructive” (44).
O’Brien, however, does seem to be striving for such a self-destructive goal — with 
regards to parodying the comic novel in particular. Frye suggests that in traditional 
comedies
[t]he overthrow of the anti-comic power has about it some feeling of a 
Saturnalia, or reversal of social order to something closer to the Golden 
Age. Such a reversal does not (at any rate not in Shakespeare) alter the 
actual hierarchy of society. Kings remain kings, and clowns clowns: only 
the personal relations within the society are altered. (104)
O’Brien’s novels showcase such hierarchies being tom apart, as disruption is not 
defeated.
In the wake of all this detail about the subversion o f comic traditions in 
postmodern metafictional works, it seems possible to suggest a more compact label to 
provide context for O’Brien’s oeuvre. Since O’Brien’s novels are, to paraphrase 
Hutcheon, comic fictions about comic fictions, it seems useful (within academic 
discourse) to dub works that both express attributes o f comedy while simultaneously 
deconstmcting and imdermining the processes of the traditional comic novel with the 
compact title metacomic.
Another obviously important aspect o f the comic equation is laughter itself, and a 
variety of theories exist that seek to explain why we laugh; the three most popular
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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theories being the Superiority, Relief and Incongruity theories.
The Superiority Theory comes, to a large degree, from Thomas Hobbes and his 
suggestion that “finding something humorous necessarily involves a feeling of triumph 
and superiority, and this is why we laugh at human incompetence, clumsiness, clowning 
and misfortune” (Clark 140). I f  as Clark suggests, “[s]ometimes the feeling is one of 
moral superiority, as when we are amused by incidents involving sex, drinking or human 
geed” (Clark 140) such a theory would certainly seem compatible with comic works that 
may use laughter to ridicule social outsiders and thus, uphold a strict status quo.
The Relief Theory, on the other hand, involves laughter that “arises from psychic 
release, ‘the arousal’, as James Feibleman puts if  ‘first of terrific fear, then of release, 
and finally of laughter at the needlessness o f the fear” (Nelson 7) after a supposed threat 
has passed. This theory could include, for example, a situation in which someone initially 
fears that his/ her life, or an aspect of his/her existence, is in danger, but then, as the threat 
passes and order is restored, comes to the realization that he or she unduly misjudged the 
situation. Thus does s/he laugh at the thought that life could have turned out otherwise, 
finding reconciliation and reassurance in a universe that seems to have returned to 
stability.
Thirdly, there is the Inconguity Theory, largely advanced by Schopenhauer and 
his belief that
[t]he cause of laughter in every case is simply the sudden perception of the 
incongruity between a concept and the real objects which have been 
thought through it in some relation, and laughter itself is just the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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expression of this incongruity. It often occurs in this way: two or more 
real objects are thought through one concept, and the identity o f the 
concept is transferred to the objects; it then becomes strikingly apparent 
from the entire difference of the objects in other respects, that the concept 
was only applicable to them from a one-sided point o f view. (Clark 145- 
146)
Throughout this thesis, I plan to demonstrate how incongruity enters O’Brien’s works in 
the form of clashing literary styles that are parodied and/or juxtaposed against one 
another; in inappropriate pairings of style and subject matter or o f character and 
social/geographical context; and language that has been fiercely bent and twisted out of 
shape. In such situations, I will show how incongruity confuses common-sense notions 
of reality; suggests the deliberate constructs that novels and language are; underlines how 
every literary style is merely a convention that has no necessary authority over another; 
and helps undermine the goal o f comic discourse.
Furthermore, if  “laughter...is...the expression of [such] incongruity” then when 
someone is in the midst of laughing, perhaps we can see them as existing in a state in 
which sense has broken down and perception has gone beyond a “one-sided” reality.
Such amusement is “enjoyable to us [because] it reconciles us to our own condition” 
(Scruton 169) of being in a plural universe. Since, in metacomedies, disruption reigns in 
the end, metacomic novels never suggest a way back to a former, common-sense 
perspective but leave us in a new, more chaotic one.
But the Incongruity Theory, as Feinberg suggests, can also be stretched in
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different directions:
Dr. Edmund Bergler...insists that we laugh not at incongruity itself but at 
the proof it offers that our teachers were wrong. In our youth, Bergler 
says, we were taught that there is logic in the world, that all things are 
‘congruous’ to the educated person. But subconsciously we suspect that 
this is not true, and incongruity delights us by furnishing evidence to the 
‘child in the adult’ that the logic which once was forced upon us is faulty. 
We triumph at this exhibition of the educator’s inadequacy, and we laugh 
at the fallibility of oin- former superiors. (102)
Such an idea has interesting consequences for a writer such as O’Brien, whose work 
undermines the authority of authors, academics, and religious figures, among others. By 
undermining what we previously believed was rote knowledge or accepted belief, comic 
incongruity, in Feinberg’s terms, expresses chaos at the level of the objective authority 
and fact delegated to us by a status quo. Though this overturning of a status quo could 
suggest that those who are in on the joke may now be in some sort of superior position, 
O’Brien himself wUl seldom, if ever, propose a new concept or belief to rule in place o f a 
previously privileged, now toppled, one.
While no single one of the above theories can make a stable, all-inclusive claim to 
explain laughter, each theory may work to describe certain situations. In such a case, the 
most suitable model for a postmodernist such as Flann O’Brien would appear to be the 
Incongruity Theory. The Superiority Theory (in which humour is derisive and aimed at 
inferiors to support some kind of status quo) seems antithetical to O’Brien’s goals. The
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Relief Theory, in which a natural order may be challenged but is ultimately re-established 
or maintained, does have a slight relation to O’Brien — here, I am thinking o f The Third 
Policeman and when discussing that novel, I shall suggest that the fact that it ends on a 
note of fear rather than release can be seen as an ironization of the Relief Theory. 
O’Brien’s texts, however, work mainly by a hyper-version of the Incongruity Theory 
where there are numerous disparate times, figures, texts and styles.
n
My thesis will focus primarily on how comedy and metafiction collide within At 
Swim-Two-Birds, The Third Policeman and The Hard Life, and with the consequences of 
what it means for a novel to be metacomic. I am leaving An Beal Bocht out of my study 
as, originally written in Gaelic, its extensive punning does not translate as fully into 
English. I am also leaving out The Dalkey Archive due to that novel’s being very much a 
re-write of The Third Policeman. However, I do feel it is necessary to engage some of 
O’Brien’s lesser-known, minor works, for he produced a number of articles and short 
stories that show the development of his comic and metafictional techniques in basic 
forms, while also sharing, elaborating upon and clarifying themes dealt with in his novels.
Even before looking at an actual work, we can see O’Brien’s metacomic 
technique at work in something as simple as his use of pen-names. The name “Flarm 
O’Brien” is, in fact, just one of the pen-names (“Myles na Gopaleen” being the other 
chief moniker) of Brian O’Nolan. Incidentally, I will, for simplicity’s sake, generally use
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“Flann O’Brien” to refer to the many-headed-hydra that this author is, following Monique 
Gallagher and her rationale that O’Brien is the name “by which [O’Nolan] is best known 
abroad” (7).
It was under the “Myles” pseudonym that O’Brien wrote a newspaper column for 
The Irish Times called Cruiskeen Lawn (or “little brimming jug” (Cronin 124)) which ran 
from 1940 to the time of his death in 1966, covered an enormous range of diverse topics 
and suggests characteristics of a metafictional nature. The pseudonym itself, which 
means “Myles of the little horses” (Cronin 127), works as a sort of ontological level set 
up by O’Nolan to exist below his real self. As O’Brien would say, the subject matter of 
Cruiskeen Lawn is “inter-related...in the prescience of the author” (At Swim-Two-Birds 9) 
and this ‘author’, according to Anne Clissmann, “became the mind, the memory and 
personality which would bind together all this amorphous mass of material, from the most 
precise and pedantic to the most universal and transcendent” (190).
“Myles” has his roots back in 1939 (Hopper 29),
when O’Brien and Niall Sheridan, using pseudonym, joined in a 
controversy being aired on the Tetters’ page [of the Irish Times)— 
significantly enough on the subject of drama, Chekhov’s The Three 
Sisters, which was not playing to full houses in Dublin at the time. When 
the stir eventually died down, O’Brien and Sheridan started various bogus 
exchanges of their own, often holding opposing points of view on 
facetious topics under different names. (Asbee 12)
O’Brien would “attackQ and counterattack^ his own endlessly shifting position” (Hopper
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29) and, subsequently, “the editor of The Irish Times was impressed enough by the 
writer’s versatility to offer him a job as columnist with that paper” (29).
Hopper considers the “letter campaign” to be “an index o f O’Brien’s emergent 
ideological position” that “demonstrated an aesthetic shift towards a polyphonic, post- 
realist mode of discourse” and “showed the deconstructive potentials of intertextual 
composition” (29). This epistolary game was very much a playful jab and mocking of 
authoritative opinion, but one that certainly suggests aspects o f At Swim-Two-Birds — a 
novel in which a variety o f literary styles jostle against each other; each weakening the 
authority of the other to such a degree that they seem to leave little more than a void in 
their wake.
The “Myles” pseudonym, then,
established a crucial distinction between author and text; a post-modernist 
theme later explored in [O’Brien’s] metafictional novels. As Myles 
himself wrote: ‘Compartmentation of personality for the purpose of 
literary utterance ensures that the fundamental individual will not be 
credited with a certain way of thinking, fixed attitudes, irreversible 
technique of expression. No author should write under his own name nor 
under one permanent pen-name.’ (Hopper 29-30)
If this “author,” then, in whose “prescience” the subject matter is “inter-related” is, 
himself, a fake, is nothing more than a frame to keep subject matter separate from a “real” 
author, then what does that say about the literary products o f that “author?” O’Brien’s 
use of such “compartmentation” expresses how any literary creation comes from “a
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certain way of thinking, fixed attitudes, irreversible technique of expression” and thus, 
does not necessarily have any natural objective authority over other portraits o f “reality” 
but merely reflects the perspective o f the creator o f the work of art in question. Each of 
O’Brien’s various compartmentations include “certain way[s] of thinking, fixed attitudes 
[and] irreversible techniques” of their own and keep the 'fundamental individual” (i.e. 
Brien O’NoIan) and his own basic attitudes hidden.
While O’Nolan himself may be somewhat o f an enigma, a trembling o f identity 
can also occur at the level of his personas. As Gallagher says, the “Myles” pseudonym 
“became a mythical figure in which were mixed characteristics borrowed firom the 
experiences of a typical Dublin man — and occasionally of O’Nolan himself — and a mass 
o f unbelievable, extravagant features” (12). According to Gallagher, “Myles, never tried 
to give a convincing, consistent image of himself..His birthdate [for instance] fluctuated 
between the sixteenth and the twentieth centuries” (12). The fact that O’Brien mixes 
aspects of himself in with this mask showcases ontological levels (those o f the real and 
fictional worlds) bleeding into one another.
The “Myles” mask can also be seen as an ironic one. Gallagher suggests that 
“O’Brien uses the different faces of his mask to observe himself observing, to distance 
himself fi-om the follies of humanity, firom his own pretension as regards a mysterious, 
incomprehensible world” (18); that “[h]e rejects a multitude of attitudes, but finally does 
not propose any in exchange” for “[h]is scathing rigour prevents him fi-om adhering to 
any ideology because his derisive mind perceives flaws in every choice” (18-19). I will 
show that such ideas of infinite regress are also present in At Swim-Two-Birds and The
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Third Policeman and that, again, O’Brien’s hyper-juxtaposition of literary styles, parodies 
and conventions agrees with this assessment of him as a writer who “rejects a multitude 
o f attitudes, but finally does not propose any in exchange.”
One of the recurring features o f Cruiskeen Lawn was the series o f stories 
involving Keats and Chapman — two poets whom O’Brien has pulled from the “real” 
world but who did not share the same historical space. Hopper describes the Keats and 
Chapman stories as “corny parables” that “involved the coining of an ingenious pun out 
o f a common platitude, which then became the punchline of an absurd anecdote, 
delivered with dead-pan solemnity” (36). One such example involves Keats, who has 
“bought a small pub in London” (na Gopaleen 188), receiving Sir Arthur Conan Doyle’s 
Dr. Watson as a patron one evening. When Watson, a less than exemplary guest, refuses 
to leave at closing time, Keats implores him and his companion with the groaner, “Come 
on now gents, have yez no Holmes to go to!” (188)
Another important feature o f these stories is O’Brien’s technique o f stealing his 
central figures from their particular historical contexts and employing them in a liberal 
variety of situations and epochs across the space/time continuum. “It is a game. Not a 
book to be read straight,” (3) says Benedict Kiely in the introduction to The Various Lives 
o f Keats and Chapman and The Brother. Indeed, the Keats and Chapman stories do 
recall Nelson’s assertion of comedy as something that “tease[s], cajole[s] and disorient[s] 
readers” and “play[s] tricks based on illusion” (152).
I will suggest another context for Kiely’s suggestion about the fact that The 
Various Lives o f Keats and Chapman and The Brother is “[n]ot a book to be read
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straight”-- that is, that the compendium of Keats and Chapman is certainly not something 
that is based in linearity, in any sense of the term. Kiely describes how
Keats and Chapman were to soldier on together in the oddest places and in 
many historical periods. They are to be found in Greyfriars where Billy 
Bunter went to school — or to the tuckshop; in the Vale of Avoca where 
Tom Moore sat under a tree and wrote a song; on the slopes of Vesuvius 
‘watching the bubbling lava and considering the sterile ebullience of the 
stony entrails of the earth’, and making a dreadful pun about the drinking 
of whiskey. (7-8)
Like the characters that are “hired” from other works o f literature to appear in At Swim- 
Two-Birds (though there is a difference here in that these two figures are not originally 
fictitious ones, only treated as such) Keats and Chapman are liberated from their original 
contexts to be sent hopping back and forth through time and space, arriving even in 
O’Brien’s present, where Keats is seen taking a ride with a millionaire in a “luxurious 
car” (na Gopaleen 197). Hopper describes “[t]he inner landscape of the Keats-Chapman 
world” as “a self-conscious intertextual zone, where familiar literary and historical figures 
freely co-mingle, and much of the comedy arises from these absurd juxtapositions” (36). 
The specific fictional realm in which Keats and Chapman move seems to be a vast play of 
signification, where ordinary notions of space and time crumble due to the vast 
incongruities juxtaposed and thus, the stories make no real sense — and anything 
resembling the significance of comic closure is, needless to say, completely out of the 
picture.
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Another comic technique utilized within the Keats and Chapman stories is 
wordplay, an aspect that “echoes [O’Brien’s] technique in the novels where the author 
manipulates the elasticity of language — in particular the nuances of Hiberno-English — 
through pun, malapropism, solecism, double entendre, metonymy and synecdoche” 
(Hopper 37). The main form of wordplay in these stories is, specifically, the pun — a 
comic device that works in a metafictional context by destabilizing language and meaning 
and calling attention to the processes by which a novel is constructed. Hopper suggests 
that “[a]ny metalinguistic device — like the humble pun — drives a metafictional wedge 
between the normal conventions of discourse and draws attention to the text as text” (37). 
An obvious example of this idea can be seen in the story in which Keats and Chapman 
pay a visit to a rich friend who is worried that his son (an obvious drunk at the age of 12) 
has contracted some strange illness. After leaving, Keats makes the diagnosis, “[t]here’s 
a nip in the heir” (na Gopaleen 190). Here, one needs to see the written version of the 
story rather than simply hear it read aloud in order to get the full effect of the pun. Such 
an example demonstrates O’Brien’s characteristic technique of foregrounding the written 
word — a metafictional/metalinguistic technique allotted greater room for development 
within his longer works. As Sue Asbee notes,
puns are [an] instance of the instability of language. The same words — or, 
indeed, as an acceptable variation, words that sound the same — used in 
different contexts indicate that the “meaning” of language is not fixed, that 
language is in fact a system of signs with no intrinsic meaning or 
reference. (116)
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The pun, according to Walter Redfem, “is clearly an agent of disorder, a disturbing 
influence” (14) that “offers the constant lesson that we can keep nothing in neat 
categories” (123). O’Brien uses puns to underline the point that we cannot keep the 
plural experiences of life in one neat, objective container, whatever that container may be. 
In comedies, a reconciliatory ending might seem an effort to suggest that the puns within 
it are only a brief structural tic and that language can make true sense o f things after all. 
But in metafictional comedies that defy closure, puns are allowed to perform with full 
flourish their natural function, never to be reigned back in.
Puns suggest the arbitrariness o f words; that words are little more than man-made 
signs. Thus does O’Brien, through his use of puns, make a joke of the authority of 
language as well as literary styles and works. Amusement here derives “from the sheer 
pleasure” we take in realizing “the perfidy of language, the ease with which a minute 
alteration can bring about a transformation of meaning” (Nelson 128). To put it in an 
ontological context: within O’Brien’s novels, traces of new worlds burst forth from the 
very words on the page.
Another significant work in the O’Brien canon is the short story, “John Duffy’s 
Brother.” While the scant critical attention paid this story has been mostly derisive 
(Clissmann dismisses it as “not particularly amusing, though it does indicate that 
O’Brien’s sense o f eccentricity was ever-present”(266)), “John Duffy’s Brother” is 
certainly characterized by comic incongruity in an ontological context. This incongruity 
is evident in a scene in which John Duffy’s brother, who has come to believe that he is a 
train (and “a particular train, the 9.20 into Dublin” (94)), engages in conversation with his
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co-workers, who act as if the whole situation is normal:
‘How many wheels has your engine?’ asked Mr Hodge. ‘Three big
ones?’
‘I am not a goods train,” said Mr Duffy acidly. ‘The wheel 
formation of a passenger engine is four-four-two — two large driving 
wheels on each side, coupled, of course, with a four-wheel bogey in front 
and two small wheels at the cab. Why do you ask?’
‘The platform’s in the way,’ Mr Cranberry said. ‘He can’t see it.’ 
‘Oh, quite,’ said Mr Duffy, ‘I forgot.’ (95)
The story deals with what McHale calls a problem “of b e in ^  — John Duffy’s 
Brother believes that he is not a man but a train, and in the above passage, that mode has 
been placed in contrast with the mode of being of his co-workers, or the nine-to-five work 
world. The laughter such a passage may provoke will express the reader’s reaction to that 
collision — how s/he is used to seeing reality as a single plane of existence, and not to 
seeing different (though potentially equal) modes of being juxtaposed in such a manner.
Though O’Brien will, true to form, undermine such notions elsewhere, this story 
also seems to underline the author (the one who creates stories and thus, meaning) as an 
omnipotent, god-like figure — an investigation very much at the heart of At Swim-Two- 
Birds. “John Duffy’s Brother” begins with an absurd statement in which the narrator 
begins to suggest the scope of his own power:
Strictly speaking, this story should not be written or told at all. To write it 
or tell it is to spoil it. This is because the man who had the strange
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experience we are going to talk about never mentioned it to anybody, and 
the fact that he kept his secret and sealed it up completely in his memory is 
the whole point o f the story. Thus we must admit the handicap at the 
beginning — that it is absurd for us to tell the story, absurd for anybody to 
listen to it and unthinkable that anybody should believe it. (91)
This story, according to Asbee, “is not a first-person narrative, but, like that of The Third 
Policeman, the position from which it is told is an untenable one” (120). The problem it 
poses is that
[i]f the story was never told in the first place, how does the present 
narrator know about it unless it happened to him, and we are, in fact, 
reading a disguised first-person narration? The straightforward answer is 
that it is O’Brien’s invention; nevertheless, the question is valid because of 
the gesture toward anecdote: “the man who had the strange experience we 
are going to talk about: (my emphasis) and the sense of authenticity this 
statement aims to confer. It presupposes the attitude that actual lived 
experience is fundamental to fiction, a view to which O’Brien certainly did 
not subscribe. (Asbee 120)
By the end of the story, “[w]e are told that the ‘strange malady’ never returned, 
but the insight Duffy gained into the workings of his mind remains to haunt him” (Asbee 
121) and that “new horizons” had been “opened for...the inoffensive, quiet citizen of 
Inchicore who would have preferred the unfathomable depths of his mind to have 
remained undiscovered” (122). The fact that the depths have been discovered (and re­
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told here) suggests the power of the author as a governing (and potentially reconciling) 
force with god-like abilities. True to form, however, O’Brien undermines this idea 
elsewhere.
“Scenes in a Novel” is a work o f  short fiction (assigned the authorship o f “Brother 
Barnabas,” an earlier O’Brien pseudonym) that subverts the author-as-god idea put forth 
in “John Duffy’s Brother.” The author-figure here is certainly less than omnipotent, and 
any remote possibility of comic reconciliation is blown into a million shards o f possible 
worlds as Brother Barnabas’ characters stage a Lucifer-like revolt against him. The main 
culprit is one “Carruthers McDaid” who, the author claims, he “created one night when I 
had swallowed nine stouts and felt vaguely blasphemous” (78). But McDaid (who, like 
Dermot Trellis’ characters in At Swim-Two-Birds, seems to be living a life o f his own 
when not in the author’s narrative focus) is less than willing when instructed to perform a 
task within a story Brother Barnabas is working on:
McDaid, who for a whole week had been living precariously by 
selling kittens to foolish old ladies and who could be said to be existing on 
the immoral earnings of his cat, was required to rob a poor-box in a 
church. But no! Plot or no plot, it was not to be.
‘Sorry, old chap,’ he said, ‘but I absolutely can’t do it.’
‘What’s this. Mac,’ said I, getting squeamish in your old age?’
‘Not squeamish exactly,’ he replied, but I bar poor-boxes.
Dammit, you can’t call me squeamish. Think of that bedroom business in 
Chapter Two, you old dog.’
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‘Not another word,’ said I sternly, you remember that new shaving 
brush you bought?’
‘Yes.’
'Very well, you burst the poor-box or its anthrax in two days.’ (79) 
Other characters give Brother Barnabas equal trouble. There is “Shaun Svoolish,” 
Barnabas’ “hero” who, we find out, has
formed an alliance with a slavey in Griffith Avenue; and Shiela, his 
‘steady’, an exquisite creature I produced for the sole purpose o f loving 
him and becoming his wife, is apparently to be given the air. You see?
My carefully thought-out plot is turned inside out and goodness knows 
where this individualist flummery is going to end. Imagine sitting down to 
finish a chapter and running bang into an unexplained slavey at the turn of 
a page!(79-80)
But things get worse still for Brother Barnabas before the story ends:
What is troubling me just at the moment, however, is a paper-knife. I 
introduced it in an early scene to give Father Hennessy som ething  to fiddle 
with on a parochial call. It is now in the hands o f McDaid. It has a dull 
steel blade, and there is evidently something going on. The book is 
seething with conspiracy and there have been at least two whispered 
consultations between all the characters, including two who have not yet 
been officially created...Candidly, reader, I fear my number’s up. (80-81) 
The metafictional joke this story turns on suggests that an author actually has a less-than
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
25
god-like control over his/her story. Here, perhaps O’Brien is suggesting that no matter 
what the author’s intentions, a work itself is an interpretive field that need not imply one 
interpretation only. Furthermore, the metacomic subversion occurring within the story 
(Barnabas, the author, is persecuted by his artistic creations) pushes Nelson’s assertion 
that there is a “disruptive force of laugher” within comedies to an ultimate, most extreme 
conclusion. In “Scenes,” nothing less than mere anarchy is unleashed upon the world of 
the story — an occurrence that serves to underline how comic closure is a very artificial 
device, especially when paired with a discourse so inherently plagued by disruption and 
so involved in the creation of new worlds. “Scenes in a Novel” suggests that the nature 
of the human world, again, is a chaos that can only be controlled through forcing 
structures onto it.
StiU, some may feel that, today, as Nelson suggests,
the most honest ending is that which simply returns us to the inadequacies 
o f the world (‘The rain it raineth every day’, as Feste moums in Twelfth 
Night), to the awareness that life is a struggle in which nobody can always 
be on the winning side, and where each o f us will sometimes fill the role 
of victim, scapegoat, or fool. (Nelson 186)
But in contemporary comedies, laughter signals the end of an old way of thinking and the 
beginning of a new; anticipates the realization and acceptance of the absurdity o f easy, 
objective reconciliation. O’Brien’s works do not simply showcase an acceptance o f such 
disturbances that Nelson describes above. His works do not ultimately “palliate” any 
“sense of doom.” Rather, O’Brien’s comic vision, one that revels in the “inadequacies”
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of human existence, suggests that the most honest ending is one that is not, in fact, an 
ending.
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Chapter Two: Bum
Early on in the novel, the unnamed narrator of Flann O’Brien’s At Swim-Two- 
Birds delivers his own personal narrative theory to his friend, Brinsley:
The modem novel should be largely a work of reference. Most authors 
spend their time saying what has been said before — usually said much 
better. A wealth of references to existing works would acquaint the reader 
instantaneously with the nature o f each character, would obviate tiresome 
explanations and would effectively preclude mountebanks, upstarts, 
thimbleriggers and persons o f inferior education from an understanding of 
contemporary literature. (33)
Brinsley responds to this intense monologue with the rather deflationary retort, “That is 
all my bum” (33).
While this manifesto may seem like a barb aimed at a specific target (e.g. the 
difficult works o f modernists such as Eliot and Joyce) it also expresses O’Brien’s attitude 
to literature in general; his delight in exposing the artificiality of literary conventions with 
a mischievous, school-boy glee. However, no literary form is reduced to the level of 
“bum” in. A t Swim-Two-Birds more than that of comedy. In O’Brien’s novel, we find the 
traditions of the comic novel meeting the disruptive mode of metafiction to create a 
chaotic. Pier 6 brawl of a book in which the comic dismption generated can never be 
satisfactorily calmed down enough to assure “the reader [who] makes implicit 
connections, fills in gaps, draws inferences and tests out himches” by “drawing on a tacit
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knowledge of the world in general and o f literary conventions in particular” (Eagleton 76) 
that any sort of absolute narrative authority or meaning, or stable vision of the universe, 
can be taken away from it.
At Swim-Two-Birds is Flann O’Brien’s first novel and his most explicitly 
metafictional one; it is the one in which the ways that works of literature create meaning 
are most blatantly exposed. The novel, according to Hopper, “is so determined to lay 
itself bare that it invites us to decentre it in straightforward manner, with signposts clearly 
provided” (113). As we move on to The Third Policeman and The Hard Life, I will 
discuss the ways in which O’Brien seems to be abandoning such metafictional studies in 
favour of simpler and more traditional narrative structures, but is, in fact, merely 
removing most of his “signposts”; that is, cloaking obvious self-referential aspects in 
more subtle ways and relying less on obvious parodies and the like. Here, however, there 
are a number of explicit ways in which O’Brien shows the novel in general, and the 
comic novel specifically, to be nothing more than a (very) “self-evident sham” {At Swim- 
Two-Birds 33).
At Swim-Two-Birds contains a plethora of ontological strata: at the (apparently) 
top level is the un-named narrator, a university student whose “Biographical 
Reminiscences” and excerpts from his work-in-progress make up O’Brien’s novel; at the 
next level down (within the narrator’s novel) is the narrator’s main character, an author 
named “Dermot Trellis”; and further down yet is the novel Trellis is writing that features 
a number of characters including John Furriskey, as well as Trellis’ own “son” Orlick, 
whom Dermot has created through an illicit relationship with one of his own characters
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and who, in a head-spinning metalepsis, begins, in turn, to write about Dermot. In 
addition, there are several other characters within each ontological level who are also 
engaged in the act of writing, and a great number of parodies existing at all ontological 
levels that serve to create a further plurality of worlds that collide and smash into each 
other like billiard balls.
At Swim-Two-Birds contains metacomic aspects. Here, that “potentially 
disruptive force of laughter” that is “at odds with the movement o f the comic fable 
towards reconciliation, harmony and acceptance of the world” (Nelson 179) and is usually 
cancelled out in traditional comedies, is allowed free reign; allowed to permanently shake 
up the model of stability that traditional comedies try to push off on the reader. While the 
novel may suggest that a new order o f consciousness can be found in a plural “reality” 
made up of a dialogic proliferation of voices, even that possibility is undermined by an 
abrupt and artificial ending at the level of story that stalls the comic movement in the 
disruptive phase, suggesting no reconciliation of disorder, and leaving the reader dizaed 
in chaos. At Swim-Two-Birds suggests that the excuse of reconciliation is not enough to 
cap the substantial amount of disorder generated by comic works, and the various forms 
of jokes in O’Brien’s novel certainly work in such a manner — i.e., here, jokes are not 
confined to situations in the story or the characters within it, but refer to aspects of the 
fiction-making process itself. Indeed, the comic subject in At Swim-Two-Birds is not so 
much a young man but the shape and substance of comic discourse itself — comic 
disruptions here certainly threaten the possibility of comic resolution. The narrator o f At 
Swim-Two-Birds does not seem to be in any prescribed situation throughout most o f the
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novel — he does not have any serious dilemmas to overcome other than avoiding his uncle 
and managing to stay in bed all day.
One of the most important ways that O’Brien creates such disruption and 
ontological confusion in At Swim-Two-Birds can be found in Patrick O’Neill’s idea of 
“entropie comedy” and “entropie parody” that I have detailed in Chapter 1. At a simple 
level, we can see At Swim-Two-Birds as a “comedy of narration” (O’Neill 138) in how 
O’Brien humorously parodies the most basic conventions of the novel format itself. The 
substance of At Swim-Two-Birds, for instance, will not be contained by the tight, 
conventional strictures of separate chapters. Though the novel starts off with the quite 
conventional heading “Chapter 1,” the action explodes outwards from there, forever 
shaking off such formal devices. Later, I will also suggest how O’Brien parodies the 
endings of comic novels, but for now, we can examine other basic conventions O’Brien 
subverts in order to suggest a parody of the novel form — such as playing with the very 
title of the book.
The title At Swim-Two-Birds comes from “the Middle-Irish romance, ‘The 
Adventure of Suibhne Geilt’” (Mellamphy 17) that involves “the seventh-century Irish 
king Sweeney” who “throws St. Ronan’s psalter into a lake and destroys his holy bell in 
an angry gesture of pagan disapproval to which he will owe his curse and his doom; 
Sweeney will be condemned to roam through the trees and shim human society” 
(Gallagher 10). Though O’Brien quotes and translates liberally from this story within his 
novel, he also slims a description of the action that occurs at “Swim-Two-Birds” into a 
mere mention of the name of the place:
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After another time he set forth in the air again till he reached the church at 
Snamh-da-en (or Swim-Two-Birds) by the side of the Shannon, arriving 
there on a Friday, to speak precisely; here the clerics were engaged at the 
observation of their nones, flax was being beaten here and there a woman 
was giving birth to a child; and Sweeny did not stop until he had recited 
the full length of a further lay. (At Swim-Two-Birds 95)
“At Swim-Two-Birds” is, according to Anthony Cronin, “a literal translation of 
the place name Snamh Da En, one of King Sweeney’s resting places in the original 
Sweeney cycle” (97). According to Cronin, “that the author did not include a translation 
of the poem which Sweeney speaks tliere ma[kes] [the title] even more mysterious” (97). 
Within the context of a work like At Swim-Two-Bird, that title does seem quite effective. 
Since the idea that the title represents is noticeably absent within the novel’s pages, that 
title resounds with the metalinguistic toll of language exposed as an arbitrary, empty, 
signifier. O’Brien’s abuse of the convention that a work’s title should reflect its content 
undercuts the traditional notion of that convention’s being able to offer the reader some 
sort of a key to the novel, or be a shape-giver to the work as a whole. Readers who hope 
to discover authoritative meaning to At Swim-Two-Birds through the title, thus, will find 
out that the joke is on them — that there is no ultimate answer.
On a more intricate (and specifically comic) level, O’Brien juxtaposes parodies of 
a number of works of literature, styles and conventions within At Swim-Two-Bird to 
create disruptive comic laughter through a kind of “comedy o f narration” that shows how, 
since these styles and conventions all seem so disparate (sometimes even while
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
32
describing similar material), the generation of meaning has as much to do with form as 
content. While parody may be a typical comic tool, the specific content o f these parodies 
is less important than the way O’Brien rubs all the incongruous styles and modes 
parodied against one another, the way he, so to speak, “thinks” them “through one 
concept” (Clark 145). That is, O’Brien “thinks” a stew of modes, genres or discourses 
through a novel which is, itself, a form of artifice that many informed readers would 
consider to be shaped in one over-riding mode — be it realism, gothic or otherwise. Such 
a mode, genre or discourse, then, will present a “one-sided point o f view” (Clark 145) o f 
reality and O’Brien’s juxtaposition of many forms of literature certainly defies and 
pollutes the strictures of comic discourse.
Incongruity (whose “object of amusement always involves something viewed as 
unusual or odd” (Martin 174)) is certainly part o f what generates the disruptive laughter 
here. Such a powerful collision between so many disparate styles works to underline the 
fact “that the novel’s claim to represent reality is firaudulent” (Clissmann 121); that any 
attempt at singular, objective representation is still going to be only a one-sided glance 
through one of many possible lenses. Mike W. Martin suggests that “the Incongruity 
Theory has the breadth needed to capture the enormous variety of things we are amused 
by” (many of which are metacomic aspects that O’Brien exploits within At Swim-Two- 
Birds and his other novels) from “amusement at imusual dress, grooming, and speech” to 
“amusement at Falstaffs departures firom his society’s ideals” and “puns, where one 
meaning of an expression deflects fi-om another more suitable or normal sense of a 
passage” (175). “In short,” Martin suggests.
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without being vacuous, [the Incongruity Theory] allows for the many 
variations suggested in the OED’s entry fo r‘incongruity’: “(I) 
disagreement in character or qualities; want of accordance or harmony; 
discrepancy; inconsistency, (ii) Want of accordance with what is 
reasonable or fitting; unsuitableness, inappropriateness, absurdity, (iii) 
Want o f harmony o f parts or elements; want of self-consistency; 
incoherence. (175)
O’Brien’s use of multiple parodies certainly creates such a “want of accordance or 
harmony” within comic discourse itself. According to Booker,
[t]he different plot lines and ontological levels o f At Swim overlap and 
freely intermix, with characters moving easily among different texts and 
discourses. For example. Trellis borrows his characters from a diverse 
array o f sources, causing characters from seemingly incompatible spheres 
to be thrust together in the same text. (33)
An example of this idea occurs within the narrator’s novel-in-progress, where “the Pooka 
McPhellimey...and his antithesis the Good Fairy...travel across the countryside toward the 
Red Swan Hotel, where Trellis’s character Sheila Lamont is about to give birth to a son,” 
and they
encounter and are joined by several other characters, including the 
cowboys Slug Willard and Shorty Andrews (characters from Tracy’s 
books), the folksy poet Jem Casey, and the mythical Irish king Sweeny.
The resulting pilgrimage is thus composed of a mixture the heteroglossia
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of which would have done even Chaucer proud. (Booker 33)
When the products o f various processes of fiction-making are cross-pollinated in this 
manner, the resulting “heteroglossia” represents how novels, story-telling, and, indeed, 
any attempt at creation will generate more meaning that pushes the firontiers of our plural 
and continuously expanding “reality” further.
One such genre he parodies is, obviously, the traditional American staple o f the 
Western, a genre whose main characters generally include cowboys, the folk heroes of 
American mythology:
One morning Slug and Shorty and myself and a few of the boys got the 
wire to saddle and ride up to Drumcondra to see my nabs Mr. Tracy to get 
our orders for the day. Up we went on our horses, cantering up Mountjoy 
Square with our hats tilted back on our heads and the sun in our eyes and 
our gun-butts swinging at our holsters. (75)
Though such a parody may already be mocking aspects o f a particular genre, by 
juxtaposing such figiures with Irish folk heroes (Finn MacCool) and the Irish landscape 
(here, Drumcondra), O’Brien also demonstrates the cultural specificity of certain genres. 
The laughter that is generated by such extreme incongruity may initiate a change in 
perspective in the reader (to one of disordered confusion) and the accumulation o f such 
incongruity over the coinse o f the novel makes it very difficult for a new, disordered 
perspective to be resolved by any authorial device. That is, it will be quite difficult for 
the reader to associate with any movement to a simple, higher ground (so to speak) by the 
end of the book.
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To further the confusion and disorder, O’Brien expresses the artifice of 
conventions through juxtaposing parodies of specific (and incongruous) writing styles 
that suggest specific voices. An example of this technique occurs during the comparison 
the narrator makes between how his characters spend their day versus his own itinerary. 
Here, we have the narrator’s own ‘̂"Nature o f daily regime or curriculum” (212) that is 
quite perfunctory in tone; the ‘“'Comparable description o f how a day may be spent, being 
an extract from  “A Conspectus o f the Arts and Natural Sciences "from  the hand o f Mr. 
Cowper” (213) which is quite formal, proper and parochial; and the ‘"‘Comparable further 
description o f how a day may be spent, being a day from  the life o f Finn” (214) which is 
characterized by elements of Irish mythology. The juxtaposition of these parodies further 
demonstrates that the substance of a work of literature is largely ordered, shaped and 
contextualized by tone, language and other conventions of a certain style, discourse, 
genre, etc.
O’Brien also frees traditional comic devices like puns and other forms of 
wordplay from the noose traditional comedies would tighten around them. As Shea 
notes, “[t]oo often we treat language as if  it were a transparent medium, a window 
through which we see ‘“ things’” but “O’Brien’s eccentric selection and combination of 
words demand that we conceive of language as an opaque, textured instrument of 
invention” (93). “Language,” he says, “is not designed to communicate information so 
much as it is designed to call attention to itself as an activity” and ‘Vf / Swim canvasses the 
texture of words and the variety of systems by which they might be combined, 
emphasizing the role of fiction as creative distortion” (93). By humorously bending
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language out of shape, O’Brien disrupts our usual view of language and its operation, 
narrowing his focus on the creation of meaning to an even finer level.
The pun is an important tool for creating comic laughter, disorder and entropy 
within a comic work; is a metalinguistic means by which one can show how language is, 
like a novel, an arbitrary means of creating order and thus, helps assure that nothing will 
be contained in what I have dubbed a metocomic work.
Puns, for instance, help to break down linear narrative structures. According to 
Redfem:
Whereas an orthodox etymologist lists the meanings of a word over the 
centuries, the punster makes them coexist, as they actually do: the word 
contains its variant senses; all words are composite, polysemous. To twig 
etymological puns, you need to have one foot (or rather ear and eye) in one 
age and the second in another: the straddle position so characteristic of 
punning. (84)
That puns have such a non-linear nature suggests they can be used to crack language (or 
the way we normally regard language) open and let it gush forth pure possibility, much 
like the very narrative of At Swim-Two-Birds itself seems to explode outwards from 
“Chapter 1.” “The key movement of the pun is pivotal,” Redfem says. “The second 
meaning of a word or phrase rotates around the first one. Or branches off from it; puns 
are switch words, like pointsmen at a junction” (23).
A specific example of such anti-linear punning in At Swim-Two-Birds involves the 
“Good Fairy,” a character who travels along with the Pooka to the Red Swan Hotel to
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compete for the soul of Orlick Trellis. Of the Good Fairy, Hopper notes how
[i]t is essentially made clear that his voice is rather effeminate, and this 
vocal quality becomes the nexus of a homosocial discourse, playing 
deliberately on the ambiguities of both ‘fairy’(magical spirit/homosexual) 
and the signifier ‘queer’ (defined again by the OED as ‘strange, odd, 
eccentric,’ or ‘slang for homosexual’). (87)
Such a pun shows a compression of historical time into a continuum where the past and 
present both contrast, yet also exist simultaneously. Here, the older, and relatively 
innocent, connotation of “Fairy” exists with the more contemporary (and pejorative) 
usage. This pun mirrors the substance of At Swim-Two-Birds itself — a fictional realm 
much like that of the “Keats and Chapman” stories, wherein a vast amount of temporal 
incongruity exists.
Puns, with their linguistic feet in different ages, also suggest the validity of 
applying the Incongruity Theory of laughter to At Swim-Two-Birds, for “[Ijaughter, and 
fresh ways of looking, alike depend often on the clash or merger between two universes” 
(Redfem 23). As At Swim-Two-Birds, like the “Keats and Chapman” stories, contains a 
sort of hyper-version of the Incongruity Theory (more than two styles are juxtaposed 
within the novel, for example) puns, similarly, do not have to feature only two meanings, 
but may feature several.
Another specific example of punning in At Swim-Two-Birds comes when the 
narrator runs into his friend Kerrigan on the street and decides to accompany him to the 
home of one Michael Byrne, “a man of diverse intellectual attainments [whose] house
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was frequently the scene of scholarly and other disputations” (134). There, the narrator 
reads from his work-in-progress and
[i]n a moment of inspired, dreadful punning, he constructs two extraneous 
characters to threaten the stability o f the plot. Shanahan and Lamont are 
almost shanghaied by ‘two decadent Greek scullions, Timothy Danaos and 
Dona Ferentes, ashore from the cooking galley of a strange ship.’ (Shea 
85)
The names of these characters. Shea says, “recall an oft quoted passage from Vergil’s 
AeneicF where “[vjoicing his suspicion of the Trojan horse, Laocoon exclaims, 'timeo 
Danaos et dona ferentes ’ (‘I fear the Greeks even when they offer gifts’)” (85). Such a 
“joke,” Shea says, “indicates a willingness to consider the sound of a word apart from its 
meaning”; that “the sounds ‘timeo Danaos’ have no necessary relationship with the 
concept ‘I fear the Greeks,’ just as the sound of the word ‘Greeks’ has no necessary 
relationship with the people who populate an Aegean peninsula” (Shea 85). Here, 
“Saussure would say that [O’Brien] is attempting to separate the signifier from the 
signified” (Shea 86). In this instance, O’Neill’s notion of “entropie parody” seems to be 
working at the level o f language, decentring the authority of meaning by suggesting there 
is no hard and fast, authoritative relationship between signifier and signified save an 
artificially created one. In this example, we may have, to a certain extent, what O’Neill 
sees in Finnegans Wake — namely a demonstration o f how that novel is “parodie of 
language itself’ (298).
Furthermore, since puns are a comic device, they work as a disruptive force not
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just at such an intellectual level but also simply through their ability to generate laughter. 
Redfem suggests that:
As for the receiver [of the pun] (who, like the fence for stolen goods, is in 
a fishy position) he often utters nervous laughter, uncertain whether or not 
to plump for the obscene or dangerous meaning, and afraid of being 
thought dense or pmdish. If he laughs, he frequently becomes an 
accomplice in the assault on a taboo. (29)
As a result, puns are complicit in assaulting societal conventions, as well as linguistic 
ones.
With all of this disruption occurring, and with O’Brien’s constant satirization of 
works that advocate or attempt to portray an objective, simple plane of reality and a 
single, stable level of authority. At Swim-Two-Birds suggests aspects of Menippean 
satire — though O’Brien may, ultimately, be critical of that mode as well. This mode of 
satire, according to Booker, “contains by its very nature a diverse collection of competing 
styles and voices” and “tends to interrogate and satirize various philosophical ideas 
(usually in a highly irreverent way)” (1). Such a plurality of “styles and multiple 
ontological levels” serves to
remind the reader that there are many different ways of describing and 
perceiving reality, as well as suggesting that language is a rich and flexible 
tool for the evocation of reality that need not consist of a mere stream of 
cliches and stereotypes. (Booker 35)
Thus, authority and objectivity are also tempered by the “Menippean” aspects that Booker
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discusses, such as “[t]he first and most fundamental characteristic o f the carnival (and 
therefore of Menippean satire)” which “is its ambivalence”; that is, “different points of 
view, different worlds, may be mutually and simultaneously present without any 
privileging of one over the other, so that the different worlds can comment on each other 
in a dialogic way” (2). This idea also returns to O’NeilTs discussion of how entropie 
parody works to level authority in terms of Nabokov’s Pale Fire where, again, “[t]he 
reader is constantly challenged to establish the relative validity of the conflicting authorial 
voices in the text to create an authorial and authoritative voice, and in the end can only 
admit the impossibility of the task” (294).
However, according to Joshua D. Esty, “[pjost-modem readings of [At Swim-Two- 
Birds] have tended to overlook how the text holds its own anarchic possibilities in check” 
and how “[f]ormal and ontological play are [j/cl contained, literally and figuratively, by a 
realistic flame story about the misadventures of the student-narrator” (40). He suggests 
that “in this way, the novel’s illusion of uncontrolled discursive layering is anchored by a 
comprehensible and referential sequence of events” (40). But Esty himself (at least in the 
context I am discussing matters) may provide us with a way out of such a difficulty, for 
his study also suggests that “[t]he novel’s multiple narrative planes in some ways serve to 
defuse its “‘dialogism’” and that
the various languages of O’Brien’s generically mismatched characters do 
not so much encoimter each other as pile up around each other. O’Brien 
deliberately eschews the formal coherence necessary for a true dialogic 
encounter among languages...Fiim and Shanahan, for example, recite and
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counter-recite rather than converse. (34-35)
He suggests that “[w]hen synthesis does occur, the results are unfortunate, as in 
Shanahan’s fusion of Jem Casey’s doggerel and Sweeny’s lyric” and that
[t]he force of the novel’s parodie mission, in other words, seems to be 
directed against a  dialogic form that would in any way synthesize Irish 
voices. In its stead, the novel offers a catalogue of languages and styles 
accumulating in sequential, repetitive, and open-ended patterns that never 
quite coalesce or conclude. (35)
At Swim-Two-Birds is a work in which a chaos, not a synthesis o f voices exists. This lack 
of a “true dialogic encoimter” that would help maintain some kind of co-existence 
between authorities disrupts the comic process to a significant extent. At Swim-Two- 
Birds does not present “a model of the dialogic search for truth, by negotiated settlement” 
(O’Neill 57) — it merely suggests aspects of one, but undermines such a settlement as 
well. This “comedy of comedy” (O’Neill 136) does not reconcile the disruption of its 
own internal mechanisms.
But still. At Swim-Two-Birds certainly seems to have closure. The novel presents 
not just one but three separate endings that try to bring the action of three separate stories 
to a close. There is the '’’'Conclusion o f the book antepenultimate” in which the narrator 
passes his courses and seems to reconcile with his uncle; the “"Conclusion o f the Book, 
penultimate” in which “Teresa, a  servant employed at the Red Swan Hotel” (312), 
inadvertently bums Dermot Trellis’ manuscript that contains his son Orlick and the others 
plotting against him, thus saving Dermot’s life; and the “"Conclusion o f the book.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
42
ultimate” which includes a kind of critical summary of all that has gone on before and 
whose tone is one of closure, but which also seems out o f the realm of the previous 
narrator’s frame of reference and, indeed, seems to have been issued by some other 
mysterious narratorial force all together. Philip J.M. Sturgess argues that, in this final 
ending, we find
an immediate, spoken idiom of such confident and acerbic wit that it can 
hardly be equated with the student’s own, and thus displaces him at the 
last from his logical position of well-centredness and authority. But in 
displacing him it does not thereby substitute an even more well-grounded 
narratorial voice, since the essential characteristic o f this voice is that it 
cannot with any certainty be assigned a place of origin. (258)
O’Brien has, at the novel’s end, suggested a further ontological level that has not been put 
forth before in the book and whose source is difficult or impossible to pin down. Like 
Dermot Trellis (whose fate we will soon see illustrated more graphically) this narrator. 
Trellis’ apparent creator, also has his authority decentred, and a tme dialogue of all voices 
within the work seems destined for defeat by the existence of such anonymity and 
ambiguity.
This aspect that Sturgess brings forth is particularly important as it suggests a 
resolution to a difficulty McHale has with At Swim-Two-Birds not being one of the 
“‘[t]me’ multiple ending texts” that “are obviously related to the forking-path narratives 
in which mutually-exclusive possibilities have been jointly realized,” such as “in Fowles’ 
The French Lieutenant’s Woman” (109). McHale suggests that despite the variety of
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endings and beginnings O’Brien’s work contains,
[i]t is important to note, however, that they are interrelated not ‘only in the 
prescience of the author,’ but in the mind of the character-narrator, a 
dilettante novelist who writes novels to illustrate his own aesthetic 
theories...In other words, this multiplication of beginnings and endings 
occurs not in the ‘real’ world of this novel, but in the subjective subworld 
or domain of the character-narrator. (109)
One might certainly argue that such an objection is undercut by the final ending of At 
Swim-Two-Birds — an ending that occurs in a “‘real’ world o f the novel” that is outside 
the student-novelist narrator’s “domain,” and thus, there may be a forking path that leads 
us out o f the world of the novel, even if we do not necessarily encoimter any true ones on 
the way in.
Still, the two earlier conclusions do suggest subversions of comic reconciliation. 
Initially, it seems as though O’Brien is suggesting that all of the chaos introduced in the 
novel can be controlled, since the three story-lines are stopped and solved quite suddenly. 
Such a perfunctory ending as O’Neill suggests this one appears to be (261) is quite 
important to the metacomic novel that O’Brien has created, serving to defy suggestions 
that the comically-created ontological disorder can be resolved satisfactorily. This 
contrived resolution underlines the artificiality of the comic mode and the fact that 
disruption would reign, if not for the guiding hand of whatever story-telling 
consciousness is creating meaning and order in its own image.
Comic reconciliation is, at the best of times, a lid barely held down atop a
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bubbling cauldron of disruptive forces that exist within comedies and that may, according 
to Frye, be resolved, at the level of story, in a “festive” atmosphere that, in turn, suggests 
some kind of tempered regeneration of life and hope for the future, both for the characters 
in the story and the reading audience on the outside who, themselves, crave order. Frye 
sees “[t]he images of chaos, tempest, illusion, madness, darkness, death” as “belong[ing] 
to the middle action of the comedy, in the phase of confused identity” and he remarks that 
“[i]t is at this point, the low point of the hero’s or heroine’s fortunes, as a rule, that the 
comic dialectic is formed” (137). While A t Swim-Two-Birds appears to be little more 
than that disrupted “middle action,” it still seems as though the equivalent of such a 
dialectic is suggested within At Swim-Two-Bird, at that very moment when the narrator 
has his change of heart. He has been defying (in the form of numerous familial disputes 
with his uncle) an old order but seems to reconcile with and become part of that old order 
upon finding out that he has passed his exams (309). The narrator warms up to his uncle, 
a change the reader can see manifested in the shift in his descriptive tone; “Description o f 
my uncle: Simple, well-intentioned; pathetic in humility; responsible member o f a large 
commercial concern” (312). This representation gives a markedly different impression 
than an earlier one: “Description o f my uncle: Red-faced, bead-eyed, ball-bellied. Fleshy 
about the shoulders with long swinging arms giving ape-like effect to gait. Large 
mustache. Holder of Guinness clerkship the third class” (11). This change in tone seems 
to manifest itself in the narrator’s work-in-progress, which ends with Trellis being 
miraculously saved and suggests that the narrator’s change o f mind trickles down to the 
benefit o f his characters (Asbee 34).
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But although the narrator may represent youthful, reinvigorating energy, O’Brien 
does not suggest that his joining of that old order will help regenerate its ranks. Here, the 
younger generation is simply integrated into the status quo rather than reforming or 
renewing it. If a comedy is supposed to end with a marriage that suggests regeneration, 
there is the suggestion of a sort o f a marriage here — but one that certainly seems ironic in 
the light of traditional comedies. For instance, this “marriage” is o f members of a young 
and an old order, not two exclusively yoimger figures. It is not a marriage filled with 
imagery of regeneration through propagation, but a “homosocial” (Hopper 87) one — a 
“marriage” o f two male characters. While this section need not necessarily suggest a 
mocking of sexual orientation, and O’Brien cannot necessarily escape condemnation for 
such tendencies (see Hopper’s discussion of “Good Fairy” above), I am more concerned, 
for the purposes of this thesis, with how this marriage will not lead either to prop^ation 
or the “birth of a new society” (Frye 72).
With regards to “Shakespearean comedies” At Swim-Two-Birds also subverts “the 
renewing power of the final action [that] lifts us into a higher world” (Frye 133) in 
traditional comic works. O’Brien’s text proves at odds with how
[i]n Shakespeare, as in all his contemporaries, the ordinary cycle of nature 
that rolls from spring to winter to spring again is the middle of three 
modes of reality. It is the ordinary physical world that, according to the 
theologians, man entered with his fall. Above it is the nature that God 
intended man to live in, the home symbolized by the biblical Garden of 
Eden and the Classical legend of the Golden Age, a world o f perpetual
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fertility where it was spring and autumn at once. To this world, or to the 
inward equivalent o f it, man strives to return through the instruments of 
law, religion, morality, and (much more important in Shakespeare’s 
imagery) education and the arts. (Frye 136)
But, again, we have a marriage in At Swim-Two-Birds that does not suggest “fertility,” 
and we do not see the narrator return “through...education and the arts” to any higher 
ground. “Education” merely tempers rebellious energy, and what represents “the arts” 
here (At Swim-Two-Birds itself) is much more suggestive o f our fallen world. Such irony 
undermines any suggestion that the structure o f the novel might signal a new way of 
apprehending the universe — that is, through an acceptance of reality being made of a 
synthesis of voices. While At Swim-Two-Birds may dangle that carrot before the reader, 
O’Brien yanks it back immediately.
Furthermore, there has been so much disruption and plurality created beforehand, 
the reader will not find an easy way back to the type o f prelapsarian existence Frye 
suggests is the aim of comic movement. Here, we see how disruption has to be 
deliberately forced  back, and in such an obvious, outrageous maimer, it would be hard to 
argue that O’Brien is making any more than an ironic use of that device.
The rescuing of Dermot Trellis by Teresa presents a parody of the reconciling 
power o f the author. Here, O’Brien is suggesting that any type of reconciling force, no 
matter how reasonable, is a kind of detts ex machina whose use stains the fingerprints of 
the author on his or her work. Many comedies, as Frye would argue, do seem artificial 
and require poetic license and a suspension o f disbelief on the reader’s part (124). Such
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artificiality is made explicit in At Swim-Two-Birds, where O’Brien certainly “does not 
[innocently] use God to underwrite his comic plots” (Frye 125) and where the ending is 
not like those o f Shakespeare, whose
conclusion[s] [are] frequently ascribed to characters or powers who act as 
though they were agents o f providence. In three of the romances a deity, 
Diana in Pericles, Jupiter in Cymbeline, and a hidden and off-stage Apollo 
in The Winter’s Tale, brings about or is involved in the conclusion. (Frye 
125)
The author-frgures who try to transform disorder in Xf Swim-Two-Birds are quite 
humanly fallible. Frye notes that when a conclusion is “accomplished by a human being, 
as it is in The Tempest and Measure fo r Measure, that character has about him something 
of the mysterious aura of divinity, symbolized by magic or sanctity” (125). O’Brien, 
however, undercuts this idea of an author as having a higher power. As with the short 
story “Scenes in a Novel,” we see here that authors are not omnipotent. In At Swim-Two- 
Birds, in fact, the reader sees what happens when an author’s work and his ontological 
being are attacked by his/her own characters. In the ill-fated attempt that Dermot Trellis’ 
characters, unhappy with the direction he impels them in, concoct to do away w th  Trellis, 
we see “Trellis...saved not by his own God-like powers, but by pure accident, further 
emphasizing the impossibility of the authorial control he so desperately seeks” (Booker 
41). Furthermore, Booker’s suggestion that “the characters cease to exist when the 
manuscript is burned, even as their creator continues to live,” underlines the fact that 
“texts, once written, have an existence of their own independent of authorial control”
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(41). The “inherent ambiguities” in the novel
place O’Brien in very much the same position as his creature Trellis — 
always in danger that his text will revolt in the hands of readers, producing 
meanings far beyond, or even directly contrary to the author’s original 
intention... Amidst the sliding signification of At Swim-Two-Birds words 
can take on multiple meanings, characters can become figures of a variety 
of personages, and intertextual connections can lead in numerous 
directions. Which of these multiple possibilities will in fact be engaged by 
a given reader depends in large part upon the particular perspective and 
cultural background of that reader, factors which are clearly beyond 
authorial control. (Booker 42)
For instance, while holding different theoretical positions, Wolfgang Iser (1222, 1229) 
and Norman N. Holland (1236-1237) both suggest that readers creatively transform works 
of literature instead of reading them in the one way an author may have intended. Thus 
does the reader have a definite hand in further cracking authorial omnipotence with 
regards to At Swim-Two-Birds.
The authorial power that brings movement towards harmony is certainly devalued 
in and by At Swim-Two-Birds. O’Brien’s “comedy of comedy” has not resolved 
“problems of modes o fbein^' (McHale 10) but underlined them, and comic discourse 
itself does not face the happy ending of its pattern coming to fruition. In the end, we 
come back to McHale’s assertion that novels like this one represent “a reality” that “now 
more than ever before is plural” (McHale 39) or, as Ninian Mellamphy suggests.
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while [At Swim-Two-Birds\ exposes the inadequacy or adolescence o f the 
shams of plot, plausibility, temporality and causality, the sham 
verisimilitude o f realism and naturalism, it does not question to the 
slightest degree the truth o f Henry James’s assertion that the only reason 
for the existence of the novel is its attempt to imitate life, to show that 
humanity is immense and that reality has a myriad forms. No, this is its 
very purpose. (13)
Thus, if, as Wylie Sypher figures, “the comic spirit keeps us pure in mind by requiring 
that we regard ourselves skeptically” (252-253) then the metacomic spirit keeps us honest 
by pushing that skepticality further to undermine all hope for purity. O’Brien’s text 
reminds us that we are stuck in that post-lapsarian weed-bank, and that any attempt at 
getting back to the garden of Eden should be viewed as just a mere bit of fun; a playful 
“self-evident sham.”
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Chapter Three: A Rather Dark Pancake
While critics may suggest that for his second novel Flaim O’Brien has produced a 
less metafictional work (Cohen 57), The Third Policeman makes many of the same 
subversive attacks on traditional comedies that At Swim-Two-Birds does. But in this 
work, the entropie parody of comic discourse is created in a more subtle manner — with 
most metafictional “signposts” (Hopper 113) pulled up and discarded, their significance 
“imbricated and embedded within the fabric o f ’ (Hopper 14) the novel. In making his 
aims less obvious, in placing the signals that let the reader discover the “sham” of both 
the novel form and comic discourse beneath a traditional story-line, O’Brien has 
produced a more mischievously seductive comic work that draws the reader into its 
construct before fully exposing its “wires” (The Third Policeman 43) and dizzying him or 
her with a flurry of ontological creation that defies control.
As with At Swim-Two-Birds, The Third Policeman provides an example o f a 
metafictionalized comedy in which traditional comic discourse is interrogated and the 
traditional pattern disrupted by devices whose chaotic presence cannot be fully resolved 
by any reconciliatory mechanism. But obvious devices such as puns and parody are not 
as important or noticeable here as in At Swim-Two-Birds, and the jokes within The Third 
Policeman that create disruptive laughter and new ontological levels seem more confined 
to the story. Still, it is quite possible, I will suggest, to interrogate the metafictional 
aspects which O’Brien has built into the comedy of this novel and discover an entropie 
parody secretly tearing away at the guts o f comic discourse beneath a thin skin of linear
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narrative and regular chaptering.
To some readers, it might be difficult to see the comic side of The Third 
Policeman, given that the world of the novel is quite “macabre,” “hellish” and “tinged 
with the grotesque” (Mays 90). While Clissmann sees “[t]he embellishment of a sinister 
and nightmarish story with pleasant and amusing detail” as “prov[ing] how near is the 
vision of comedy to chaos and unreason” (180), she also posits that “[t]he comic reductio 
tends to lead to the world of the absurd...a world in which O’Brien was unable to live for 
very long” and which, she says, he felt was “unbearable” (181). In fact, according to 
Clissmann, “when he put The Third Policeman aside and rewrote it as The Dalkey 
Archive, O’Brien moved firom the horrors of illogical abstraction and turned to the 
promise of accepted mysteries” (181). Nevertheless, I would argue that O’Brien’s 
oeuvre, as a whole, is too involved in questioning “accepted” norms for him to find such 
aspects of existence so extremely “unbearable” — indeed, another later novel. The Hard 
Life, does not embrace much in the way of “accepted” literary norms. Still, Clissmaim’s 
observations underline the inescapable fact that the humour within The Third Policeman 
can be rather dark. On the other hand, Alan Warner asserts that “[e]ven if the ultimate 
effect is horrific, the style and manner of the book is comic. The reader is constantly 
surprised by the narrator’s encounters and conversations with the people he meets. The 
‘funny-peculiar’ and the ‘funny-ha, ha’, blend into each other” (159). That is, the 
ironization of comic reconciliation at the end of the novel may be bleak but, placed in the 
context of a novel full of jokes and ludicrous images of sexualized bicycles and armies of 
one-legged men, that bleakness is not allowed to absorb all the humour. But despite this
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
52
humour. The Third Policeman (as I will expand upon later) certainly does suggest darker 
implications with regards to a metacomic vision than At Swim-Two-Birds seems to.
In The Third Policeman, the comic subject is not as obviously comic discourse as 
it is in At Swim-Two-Birds. Here, the subject does seem, at first, to be the narrator and 
the series of difficulties he encounters within the world of the novel. This narrator, while 
not looking for “marriage” in the conventional sense, is involved in suggestions of 
ironized marriages that undermine comic reconciliation. But when the reader discovers, 
at novel’s end, that the narrator (who is never named, but whom Hopper refers to as 
“Noman”) has been dead throughout the story and thus, should not have access to paper, 
the reader must come to the conclusion that s/he is getting the story via the medium of the 
narrator’s explicitly literary consciousness itself. Therefore, due to the unconventional 
ontological state of the narrator, the novel’s artificiality will, ultimately, be foregrounded 
after all and things will suddenly become quite “self-evident.”
Basic examples of comic discourse are apparent in the text, too. While there 
might not be numerous incompatible parodies or styles rubbed together in as blatant a 
manner here as in At Swim-Two-Birds (though the foomotes, I will suggest later, do seem 
to function in a similar, if less obvious, way), there are more subtle examples of comic 
incongruity evident in The Third Policeman. One such example occurs where 
“Fox...declar[es] that he has taken some of the protagonist’s omnium to paper the walls of 
his own little police barracks” (Simpson 79) and feels the need to confess so. In this 
instance, according to Simpson,
so elaborate are Fox’s strategies (involving politeness) that they suggest
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that he has made some enormous imposition on the protagonist.. Jiowever, 
Fox’s revelation, when it eventually comes, is no more than the rather 
trivial admission that he has used a negligible amount o f the addressee’s 
omnium supply for the equally trivial purpose o f wallpapering his own 
police barrack. (79-80)
Because o f the god-like quality omnium grants its possessor (Simpson 80), “the 
revelation that this ‘imutterable substance’ has been borrowed for the mimdane purpose 
o f interior decorating, is particularly banal” (80). This incident provides an example of 
what Clissmann calls “a hallmark of O’Brien’s comic method” (167). Here, “[t]he 
supreme incongruity...is attained by [O’Brien’s] presentation of...horrtfying elements 
combined with the most trivial and ordinary concerns” (167). In this case, comic impact 
derives from a “banality” that generates a laughter based on the disruption of our normal 
perception of the dichotomy between the mundane and either the supernatural or the 
divine.
A similar example of incongruity occurs near the end of the novel, when the 
narrator imdertakes an extended rant about what glorious achievements he could make 
with omnium. Such possibilities include “improv[ing] the weather to a standard day of 
sunny peace with gentle rain at night washing the world to make it fresher and more 
enchanting to the eye” and having a “sow [that] would farrow twice a day and a man 
would call immediately offering ten million poimds for each of the piglings, only to be 
outbid by a second man arriving and offering twenty million” (195-196). The narrator’s 
reveries are interrupted by Fox, who approves of omnium because “‘[y]ou would not
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believe the convenience of it...it is very handy for taking the muck off your leggings in 
the winter’” (196). Subsequently, the narrator engages in another substantial rant wherein 
he works up an elaborate scheme to monkey-wrench the mechanics of eternity and make 
the lives of the other two policemen quite difficult (196-197). He is interrupted yet again 
by Fox, who reveals how omnium ‘“ is a great convenience for boiling eggs...if you like 
them soft you get them soft and the hard ones as hard as iron’” (197). Here, O’Brien 
juxtaposes a representation of what different people do with knowledge — the practical 
versus the impractical. Such a juxtaposition, then, reduces the ludicrous, god-like goals 
o f the narrator to the level of “bum.”
Along with the (seemingly) straightforward comic aspects. The Third Policeman 
does, at first glance, seem to have a more straightforward narrative — a more traditional 
story — than At Swim-Two-Birds. The novel begins in a rather clear, linear movement; 
with what Hopper refers to as “a parody o f the Bildungsroman” (116). This parody takes 
the form of a perfunctory recounting o f the narrator’s childhood, the death o f his parents, 
and his association with John Divney, the man entrusted with his parents’ property while 
he is away at school. Upon completing his education and returning home, and needing 
money to finance a book on the commentators o f an eccentric scientist named “de Selby” 
whose theories he developed an interest in while at school, the narrator concocts a plan 
with Divney to rob and kill an old man named Mathers for his box of money (15-16). 
They do so, but Divney slips aw ay with the box himself and hides it, and the rest of the 
novel describes the narrator’s subsequent efforts (in the rather strange coimty he finds 
himself in) to retrieve that box. While somewhat disturbing in its portrayal of a topsy-
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turvey world, the continuing linear movement o f The Third Policeman's narrative makes 
the story easy to follow and seems to promise the reader that a neat conclusion of some 
sort is inevitable — until the narrator’s true ontological state is revealed.
But it is certainly possible to move away from the level of story to “a 
metafictional plane” where this novel can be seen as engt^ing in a rather narcissistic 
focus on its own processes. Hopper says that
the picaresque journey in The Third Policeman — the ‘bigger story’ — is a 
quest to discover the borderland between reality and fiction...Noman 
wavers between an awareness that he is a character trapped within a 
fictional order and his realist belief that he is a ‘real-life’ person. 
Throughout the novel. Noman’s hellish punishment is his growing 
realisation of the gulf between language and the ‘real world’ it refers to, 
and his awareness of the frame which contains him. (110)
Mathers’ box “supposedly contain[s] enough money to allow Noman to publish his book 
on de Selby” and thus “represents a possible book” (Hopper 117). “Metafictionally,” 
Hopper says, “the box...contain[s] a substance called ‘omnium’ (translated as 
‘omniscience’), i.e. knowledge” (117). That is, “[t]he secret of the black box,” according 
to Hopper, “is that it is the book of knowledge” that can grant the narrator “the power to 
manipulate all the other puppet-characters of the text, including the other policemen” 
(149), thus establishing himself as a sort of “author-god.”
In addition to representing a book, the box could also be a representation of the 
narrator’s identity. According to Hopper, “Noman’s loss of identity is intrinsically linked
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to the black box” (Hopper 117) — that is, all the strange things in the novel (including the 
narrator’s discovery that he “[does] not know [his] name” (The Third Policeman 32) 
anymore) begin to happen after he reaches for the spot beneath the floorboards in 
Mathers’ house where Divney claims to have hidden the box (The Third Policeman 24).
In such a context, the narrator’s search for the box can represent a quest whose successful 
completion will end in a kind of marriage — a marriage of the narrator with the 
knowledge of his identity. Such a marriage would restore order to him as well as giving a 
comforting sense of same to the reader.
There are many other blatant metafictional moments and aspects in the novel that 
show a concentration on the fiction-making process at work. There is, for instance, the 
narrator’s revelation of his wooden leg. It seems that he “met one night with a bad 
accident” and as a result, he tells us, “I broke my left leg (or, if you like, it was broken for 
me) in six places and when I was well enough again to go my way I had one leg made of 
wood, the left one” (10). Here, it is possible to
posit...that some other agent broke Noman’s leg — ‘it was broke for me’.
If Noman is a character in a fictional world (unknown to himself at this 
stage) then we could say that his leg is broken because it suits the 
machinations of the plot — later on Noman will meet Martin Finnucane, 
the leader of the ‘Hoppy men’, a gang of similarly handicapped bandits. 
This scene can then be read as an establishing shot. (Hopper 212-213) 
Other metafictional scenes include where Pluck refers to MacCruiskeen as “a 
comical man [italics mine]...a walking emporium, you’d think he was on wires and
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worked with steam” and says that “[h]e is a melody man...and very temporary, a menace 
to the mind” (78). Here, it seems as though Pluck is directing the narrator to 
MacCruiskeen’s fictionality (and thus, the narrator’s as well), and that they are all in a 
specifically comic fiction at that. J.C.C. Mays suggests that
[i]f we are at first reassured by the enormous burly forms of the policemen, 
we nearly choke, as the narrator does, when Sergeant Pluck taps his 
forehead to produce ‘a booming hollow sound, slightly tinny, as if  he had 
tapped an empty watering-can with his nail’. In the end, of course, we 
realize it is true that he is only ‘a toy man’, just as MacCruiskeen is only ‘a 
walking emporium..on wires and worked with steam’. Little is clear about 
Fox ‘except his overbearing policemanship, his massive rearing o f wide 
strengthy flesh, his domination and his unimpeachable reality’, yet he is 
the least credible. (94-95)
Interestingly enough, in the context of a novelist who seeks to undermine literary 
hierarchies, the most noticeable authority figures here, the policemen, are quite 
buffoonish.
Even more specifically, Sergeant Pluck’s numerous epigrammatical sayings 
(“‘That is a great curiosity...a very difficult piece of puzzledom, a snorter’” (58); ‘“ UJt is 
a fascinating pancake and a conimdrum of great incontinence’” (127); ‘“It is nearly an 
insoluble pancake...a conundrum of inscrutable potentialities’ (158)) seem to refer to the 
mysterious nature of this novel itself, to the puzzle of its actual but hidden metafictional 
nature, and to the narrator’s “real” ontological state. Such epithets also present an
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example o f the language-play that Asbee discusses in the context o f At Swim-Two-Birds, 
where
the phrase ‘a nice cup o f tea’ becomes extraordinary when it is used in 
cory unction with the word paralysis. ‘Paralysis is a nice cup o f tea’ makes 
us stop and consider. It may provoke a smile, but if it is examined closely 
it becomes apparent that the phrase is meaningless and arbitrary. Spoken 
language that is common to us all, placed in the context of a self-conscious 
literary work, suddenly becomes strange. (116)
The novel also has a metalinguistic focus. In The Third Policeman, the arbitrary 
relationship between signifier and signified and the plurality o f language are also 
represented, but in more subtle ways than the out-and-out punning of At Swim-Two-Birds. 
The narrator himself is bereft of a signifier, as evidenced in the scene where Sergeant 







‘The O’Growneys, the O’Roarty’s or the Finnehys?’ (105)
Importantly, it seems as though the narrator could use any of these if he wanted to and 
thus, fireed from the assumption that language is tied to reality, he is caught up in a comic.
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yet also horrific, plurality where nothing can be fixed.
The instability of language is also demonstrated during one of the narrator’s 
footnotes, where he discusses “Le Fournier, the reliable French commentator” who
suggests that de Selby, when writing the Album, paused to consider some 
point of difficulty and in the meantimes engaged in the absent-minded 
practice known as ‘doodling,’ then putting his manuscript away. The next 
time he took it up he was confronted with a mass o f diagrams and 
drawings which he took to be the plans of a type of dwelling he always 
had in mind and immediately wrote many pages explaining the sketches. 
(23)
As filled with unlimited potential as language may be, O’Brien suggests that it is, 
therefore, quite useless with regards to its basic function of representing reality. Another 
example of this difficulty comes in the aftermath of the accident where Gilhaney almost 
loses MacCruiskeen’s wooden chest: “When MacCruiskeen foimd his tongue again he 
used the most unclean language ever spoken anywhere. He put names on Gilhaney too 
impossible and revolting to be written with known letters” (116). Later, when the 
narrator attempts to retrieve the box from Mathers’ house he receives only a surprise 
instead: “I cannot hope to describe what it was but it had frightened me very much long 
before I had understood it even slightly” (24).
It is easy to agree that “[t]his novel portrays a world in a state of impossible flux, 
where language becomes an important poetry of improvisation” (Hopper 110). Little 
stability of any kind is suggested by The Third Policeman, and the instability of language
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itself is reflected in the land in which the narrator moves; a land o f plurality, where 
meaning is generated at the drop of a story. “Joe,” the narrator’s “soul,” claims that: 
“Apparently there is no limit...Ar^thing can be said in this place and it will be true and it 
will have to be believed.” (88). The “reality” here is, literally, fluid, as Sergeant Pluck 
informs the narrator during a dissertation on “the Atomic Theory” (85), which Pluck 
suggests is manifesting itself in the world of the novel in strange ways:
‘The gross and net result of it is that people who spend most of their 
natural lives riding iron bicycles over the rocky roadsteads o f  this parish 
get their personalities mixed up with the personalities of their bicycle as a 
result of the interchanging of the atoms of each o f them and you would be 
surprised at the number of people in these parts who nearly are half people 
and half bicycles.’ (88)
Despite such problems, the narrator still attempts to use language as a tool with 
which he can build a solid plane of existence for himself. Despite these attempts, though, 
the narrator, according to Shea, “[djivested of a name..flnds himself imable to distinguish 
his presence from that of the wind, various dogs, or even the American gold watch he 
claims to have lost. No name means no identity, no originality” (134). Shea asserts that 
[wjhenever someone proclaims his ‘blank anonymity,’ [the narrator] 
counter punches with meditative, charged metaphors that elicit further oral 
articulation. Words, which authorize his negation, become the means 
through which he attempts to mediate an existence. (136)
Pushing this position to a more extreme level. Shea suggests that “our questionable hero
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responds to the news o f his dissolution by composing a novel which amounts to his own 
obituary... tenaciously compet[ing] with all assertions of his absence” (137). 
Consequently, the novel could represent the narrator’s attempt to fix order to his 
existence — an attempt that, I shall suggest, is undermined in a number o f ways. This 
subversion of the authority o f  language can then be seen to suggest that novels contain 
nothing but themselves; are nothing but attempts to impose meaning, order, and a single 
ontological plane onto our shared existence, where there is none inherent.
While The Third Policeman conforms to McHale’s ontological requirements for a 
work of fiction to be considered postmodern, it also explores the modernist “dominant” 
(McHale 9) of epistemology. According to Booker, this novel “is above all else a 
detailed exploration (and deflation) of traditional Western epistemological systems like 
science, philosophy, and religion” (46). Booker calls The Third Policeman an 
“antiepistemological” (47) work, in the line of “numerous authors [who] have 
launched...demystifying assaults against the epistemological tradition of the 
Enlightenment” (47). Such “assaults,” Booker posits, come from Nietzsche’s essay “On 
Truth and Lies in the Nonmoral Sense” (46) which “suggests that the search for Truth and 
the quest for centres and origins that underlie the epistemological investigations of post- 
Cartesian Western philosophy are doomed to failure” (Booker 47).
The Third Policeman, though, with its rather unfixed world, can represent “a 
highly camivalesque deflation o f epistemological pretensions” (Booker 47). An example 
of such a deflation comes with the “‘Codex’...a manuscript” in which “not one word of 
the writing is legible” (The Third Policeman 150). Booker notes that
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[t]here are also rumours that the ‘Codex’ may be a forgery, and to top 
things off, there are at least four different copies, each radically different 
from all the others, that claim to be the genuine original of the document... 
The Codex’ thus flmctions...as a representation of the illusory nature of 
the ‘Truth’ so fervently sought by the inquiries of Western epistemology. 
But even when de Selby’s texts can be located and deciphered, it is still 
often difficult to ascertain their authenticity. (Booker 50)
This fiasco, and the “Codex,” also works as a representation of a “reality” that “now more 
than ever before, is plural” (McHale 39) and thus, “epistemological pretensions” o f truth 
and reality are punctured. The disputations of the critics demonstrate how worlds are 
created, how multiple ontological planes are generated both by the writing o f new works 
and by the reading of old ones, and certainly, in O’NeilTs terms, present an example o f a 
“decentred discourse” (xiii). To keep up the novel’s disguise, O’Brien has set this 
metafictional motif in the story, within the narrator’s tale, rather than calling attention to 
it via glaring “signposts.”
If it is possible to see that “all systematic programs for the pursuit o f  knowledge 
inevitably lead to...invidious quests for mastery” in the narrator’s goal of publishing a 
“definitive de Selby index” (The Third Policeman 14), and in the fact that he “seems to 
have spent a great deal more time reading de Selby’s critics than reading de Selby 
himself’ (Booker 52), such an obsession need not only relate to epistemology but 
ontology as well. Here, the behaviour o f the narrator and the other scholars generates a 
proliferation of virtual de Selbys rather than focusing on or discovering a single one. The
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
63
fact
[t]hat Hatchjaw, Bassett, and their fellow scholars never succeed in 
solving any of the mysteries surrounding de Selby (or each other) is merely 
another manifestation of the futility of all quests for certain knowledge in 
The Third Policeman. The shenanigans of these hapless scholars are 
endless in more ways than one. Not only does their work fail to reach 
conclusions but it in turn generates additional work by meta-commentators 
(like Henderson, author of Hatchjaw and Bassett) whose work is similarly 
inconclusive. There is an implication that this process might spiral 
outward forever. The notes in The Third Policeman might be construed as 
a metacommentary on de Selby one level above Henderson, just as the 
essay I am writing now can be read as a metametametacommentary one 
level above O’Brien. (Booker 53)
In a specific ontological context, the war between these critics serves to create a 
proliferation of possible worlds that are not resolved back into one again. Since de Selby 
only exists, at best, in his work and in the work of his commentators (whose 
“identities...are [also] called into question” (Hopper 196)), it is impossible to resolve him 
into a single “real” entity once again — to peg either a critical or biographical truth to one 
“de Selby.”
The storm that chums up this blizzard of ontological creation is brought into the 
work through one of the few obvious signposts O’Brien employs in The Third Policeman 
— the numerous footnotes, regarding the narrator’s interpretation of de Selby, that he
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appends to his own narrative. It is important to point out, for this metafictional context, 
the “peculiarly literary quality” (Hopper 179) of foomotes; that
foomoting is an established branch of discourse that has a practical 
scholarly usage (citing influences, avoiding plagiarism, offering 
background information) and does not seem out of place within a text, 
albeit a fictional one. (Hopper 179)
But here, on the other hand, foomoting is not so much familiar as disruptive, snapping the 
linear movement of the reading process and rupturing the stability o f the discourse. As a 
result, this feature may very well be the “most overt (and distinctive) frame-breaking 
device of the text” (Hopper 177). Hopper suggests that “in The Third Policeman, the 
author gradually dismantles the textual apparatus to a point where the foomotes and the 
text compete for space and signifying supremacy” (Hopper 180). Furthermore, “[t]he 
final foomote appears in chapter eleven and consists of 160 lines spread out over six 
pages; a sub-narrative demanding a completely separate reading from the main body of 
work — in fact, for a while it is the main body of work” (Hopper 181). This “sub- 
narrative of the feuding critics gains its own momentum, seemingly independent of the 
text which spawned it” and “even acquires its own rhetorical mode, re-told in a style 
reminiscent of nineteenth-century gothic romanticism” (181).
The foomotes create additional meaning through the very act of engaging the 
reader. The reader “find[s] [him or herself] manipulating the physical text like a puzzle, 
jumping forwards and backwards through the novel’s spatial and temporal arrangements, 
improvising an order” (Hopper 182). Hopper also suggests that “[t]he foomotes in toto
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constitute a thirteenth chapter” ( 185), a function that, he asserts, is allowed for “in 
chapter five when MacCruiskeen shows Noman his infinite series of chests” and 
“arranges thirteen of them ‘in a row upon the table’” (Hopper 185). This incident also 
contains a metafictional aspect that points to The Third Policeman itself — specifically, 
when “Noman autocritically remarks: ‘These are the most surprising thirteen things I 
have ever seen together’” (Hopper 185). The significance o f this extra chapter is also 
quite important to the operation o f the novel, as
[t]he interplay between this internal thirteenth chapter (an allegory of 
reading) and the primary text (an allegory of writing), reflects the 
polyphonic composition of the novel’s language (i.e. self-cancelling and 
contradictory voices), and the vast range o f secondary worlds (anecdotal 
digressions, cut-up narrative, dreams, etc.) [within this novel]. (Hopper 
185)
Such a “polyphonic composition” creates great ontological confusion and decentres 
primary authority into chaos, creating an entropie parody of the “one-world” novel form 
in the process.
These footnotes also work to subvert sense in The Third Policeman in much the 
same way that the constant parodying in At Swim-Two-Birds destabilizes and decentres 
ultimate authoritative meaning and interpretation and, thus, they function here as key 
players in an entropie parody that pokes fun at the novel form’s ability to shape or suggest 
a single, stable reality. Here, “as the narrative of the margins unfolds not only is de 
Selby’s sanity doubted but his works are questioned by Hatchjaw...although Hatchjaw
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himself might not exist either” (Hopper 195-196). In fact, “[s]o much is contradictory 
that nothing can be accepted at face value, and we are left with the possibility that the 
entire footnoted sequence is an imaginary confabulation; a fictive product of Noman’s 
unstable mind” (Hopper 196). If the footnotes simultaneously create multiple worlds 
while undermining the ability of an “authority” to control, solve or otherwise order them, 
they work in the self-conscious manner described by Hutcheon. She suggests that “the 
coimter-pointed double-voicing” of “the index and commentary of Nabokov’s Pale Fire, 
the list of plagiarisms in Alasdair Gray’s Lanark, or the parodie footnotes in Tom Jones, 
Tristram Shandy, or the tenth section of Joyce’s Finnegans Wake" all “[call] attention to 
the presence of both author and reader positions within the text and to the manipulating 
power of some kind of ‘authority’” (Hutcheon 88).
The narrator himself must represent an important puzzle-piece o f the novel’s 
metafictional structure — since, obviously, the reader is getting the story through him. 
Cohen suggests that “[w]e have, as in .4/ Swim-Two-Birds, a uimamed narrator” who “has 
written a scholarly volume on a fictional savant named de Selby” (60). The Third 
Policeman, though,
has been crafted to resemble a personal memoir to accompany the 
narrator’s ‘de Selby Index’ as a sort of companion-piece. Everything 
about the telling of the story assures the reader that it was written well 
after the events described, for it has been filled with afterthoughts, 
backward glances and an amazing progression o f footnotes on de Selby 
and his commentators. (Cohen 60)
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Consequently, “[t]he reader will be more alarmed when...he discovers that the narrator 
has unknowingly been dead since the twenty-third page o f the book,” which means that 
“[t]he book...has been written by a corpse, and one who only knows one thing for certain: 
that he lives” (Cohen 60). Cohen also insists that, “[f]inally, the circular nature of the 
ending takes away all possibility of the text having been written by the narrator” and 
“[t]he reader” discovers that s/he “has been ‘outwitted in a shabby fashion and caused to 
experience a real concern for the fortunes of illusory characters’” (Cohen 60).
This example makes it evident that The Third Policeman presents a much subtler 
metafiction than At Swim-Two-Birds, for
[ijnstead o f denying realism, as many Post-modernists have done, O’Brien 
in The Third Policeman uses the type o f illusion associated with realism, 
slowly stretches the reader’s suspension of disbelief as the situations grow 
more bizarre and then exposes the illusion and the impossibility of the 
narrative. (Cohen 60)
The Third Policeman “does what .4/ Swim-Two-Birds could not; it forces the reader to 
confront the text as text, but also draws the reader into its shabby tyrannical realism” 
(Cohen 60).
Basic conventions of the narrative process are undermined here as well. With 
regards to “the possibility o f the text having been written by the narrator,” Asbee ponders 
“[wjhere and when...is the story told?” (55). She suggests that “the narrator of At Swim- 
Two-Birds writes in his stuffy bedroom” but wonders
[f]rom what position or perspective does the narrator o f The Third
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Policeman tell his story? It is impossible to say: it is written in the past 
tense, but the narrator’s memory is limited and seems to become more 
so...Ultimately, all that can be said is that there is no provision in the text 
for the “space” from which the story is recounted. (55-56)
Narrative space (as well as narrative authority) seems to be decentred in The Third 
Policeman. Then again, one could also suggest that no more provision o f space is 
required than the novel itself — at least, as I shall explain, in a metafictional case such as 
this one.
It is possible to see the narrator as coming close to discovering his fictionality and 
thus, escaping the clutches of his creator. Hopper asserts that The Third Policeman 
represents the narrator “flickering between an awareness that he is a character trapped 
within a fictional order and his realist belief that he is a ‘real-life’ person” (110). His 
“hellish punishment is his growing realisation of the gulf between language and the ‘real 
world’ it refers to, and his awareness of the fi-ame which contains him” (110). An 
example of this assertion. Hopper suggests, can be foimd in the experience that the 
narrator has during his trip to “eternity”; “[t]here are no suitable words in the world” {The 
Third Policeman 139) with which he can recount it fully. During this trip, he encounters 
“objects” (139) whose “appearance, if even that word is not inadmissible was not 
understood by the eye and was in any event indescribable. That is enough to say” (140). 
Hopper suggests that
[t]his is a meta-narrative description (i.e., a narrative which refers to itself 
and its own procedures), dramatised by Noman’s struggle for meaning in
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his own life. The problem of even describing this problem o f description, 
in itself defies description — ‘there are no suitable words’ — yet 
paradoxically, he must use words to describe his wordlessness. In the end 
he concedes defeat: ‘that is enough to say.’ (110)
Despite such possibilities, the narrator never quite attains such an awareness and, thus, 
remains imprisoned in fiction. If the words on the page represent the (explicitly literary) 
consciousness of the narrator, then it seems possible (if a bit fancifiil) to see that the 
narrator is not just “trapped within a literary machine” (Hopper 120) in general, but is 
trapped within the leaves, caged between the covers o f the physical copy of The Third 
Policeman that the reader is holding in his or her hands. Each copy of the book is 
haunted, in a sense, by the narrator, whose aphysical literary consciousness has been 
imprisoned there by his creator, the once-vaunted “author-god.”
In that case, one may wonder, is O’Brien suggesting the omnipotence of the 
author-god after-all? Is he playfully changing his position from At Swim-Two-Birds, 
where authorial omnipotence is undermined? Then again, perhaps the reader can, in a 
sense, free the narrator through the act of reading, by engaging the novel and its 
substance, and by interpreting that substance and, thus, releasing the narrator (the novel’s 
main character) from the sterility O’Brien has locked him into. Upon engaging The Third 
Policeman, the reader may then be, so to speak, possessed by interpreted versions o f the 
ghost — and any number o f ghosts may result depending on how many people read the 
novel.
The metafictional “flux” that parodies aspects of the novel form here also
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undermines the comic tradition and the comic novel itself. Metacomically, The Third 
Policeman (like At Swim-Two-Birds) underlines the artificiality of the traditional 
comedy’s reconciling force and “renewing power that lifts us into a higher world” (Frye 
133). Such quests for ordering as are suggested by notions of “Truth” and “centres” are 
certainly part of the reconciling mechanism o f traditional comedies, and any investigation 
of such can have more bearing on postmodern ontological concerns (where “truth” is 
pluralized) than epistemological quests that seek to realize a single “truth.” The Third 
Policeman not only fails to suggest any movement to a higher world — it contains a 
proliferation of “secondary worlds” (Hopper 118).
Still, The Third Policeman does tantalize the reader with several possibilities for 
closure, as well as suggestions of stability and authorial omnipotence. There is, for 
example, the narrator’s encounter with Fox, the “third policeman” himself. During this 
encounter, “[i]t seems to the narrator that everything has been explained” and, of course, 
“[h]is mind likes such an all-inconclusive pattern as that suggested by the policeman and 
his use of omnium” which “offers [the narrator] complete and terrible power over the 
policeman and his erstwhile associate in crime, John Divney” (Clissmann 178). With 
omnium he can “do anything, see anything and know anything with no limit to [his] 
powers save that of [his] imagination” {The Third Policeman 195). But still, while this 
revelation may suggest a resolution to ail the strange occurrences, in the creating force of 
omnium there exists, paradoxically, a representation of the pliability o f “reality,” which 
concurs with the multiple ontological levels created throughout the novel.
Traditional comic reconciliation is also undermined in The Third Policeman
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through the ridiculous “marriage” o f the narrator and his bicycle: “I felt once more 
comfortable in mind and body, happy in the growing lighmess o f my heart. I knew that 
nothing in the whole world could tempt me from the saddle on this occasion until I 
reached my home” {The Third Policeman 200). Though “[t]he theme of marriage is re­
enacted in the love affair between Noman and the female bicycle,” Hopper suggests that 
“this is set up only to be strategically abandoned; after all. Noman is dead and his loved 
one is a bicycle” (151). This ironic marriage certainly suggests a symbolic defeat o f the 
power o f traditional comedies.
Hopper also finds
[a] possible closure [in] the revelation of Noman’s death, but what pulls it 
back from the brink of realism is the final circular loop: Noman is dead 
but it is a living death of infinite regress, destined as he is to cyclically re­
enact his adventures for eternity...Noman had hoped to escape the limits of 
the final pages by running away with the female bicycle, but now that hope 
had faded. (151)
It is important to note that “although the end o f the book certainly takes us back, it does 
not return us to the novel’s opening” (Asbee 52). But O’Brien does suggest that the 
pattern will repeat from this point on ad infinitum for the narrator (and now for Divney as 
well), just as the “secondary worlds” (Hopper 118) o f stories and realities in The Third 
Policeman explode out forever, before even being engaged by the readers, who will bring 
further levels of meaning to the novel.
There is yet another sort of marriage suggested here, when the narrator and
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Divney are “wedded” together in a shared fate: “I heard distant footsteps on the road 
behind me...It was John Divney. We did not look at each other or say a single word. I 
fell into step beside him and both of us marched into the police station” (205). This 
“marriage” defies the traditional comic kind by not leading to any regeneration or a 
movement to the idealized higher world the endings o f traditional comedies suggest. 
Indeed, here is a  more brutally finnk subversion o f comedy than At Swim-Two-Birds 
presents the reader with. The Third Policeman showcases a movement to a lower world 
than the ordinary, fallen world human consciousness inhabits — a movement to Hell 
rather than Eden, let alone Heaven. Thus is the lack of reconciliation in The Third 
Policeman certainly represented in an explicitly darker light than m A t Swim-Two-Birds.
Comic reconciliation is also undermined in The Third Policeman through 
O’Brien’s ironic use of aspects described by the Relief Theory of laughter. According to 
Nelson, there is a connection between this theory and traditional comic discourse; that is, 
“[i]t complements the medieval formula, where comedy begins with dangers or 
difficulties and ends with their resolution” (7). O’Brien’s novel suggests both a use and 
possible ironization of that theory and thus, subverts the ordered closure offered by such 
“relief.” Asbee notes that
when O’Brien implies that the events of his novel are endlessly doomed to 
repeat, and his protagonist must go through the business of trying to 
understand his surroundings, lose that understanding, and begin again and 
again, the writer is appealing to what may be an unconscious horror in us 
all. There is a clear distinction between the comfortable, repetitive.
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remembered patterns on which we build our lives and the unbidden system 
that threatens to take us over. (54)
At this point, the narrator’s destiny and existence is taken over and readers can see “[a] 
curious illusion...created, for when we reread any novel, we embark on a hauntingly 
familiar journey of complication and crisis with the hero, who always, as we read, has to 
undergo the process o f education once more” (55). Here, comic reconciliation never 
comes. The disruptive stage is forever. Relief is denied in a very dark manner.
It is also possible to see, by contrasting them with The Third Policeman, how 
“‘conventional’ novels rarely leave their protagonist in exactly the same situation as he or 
she was at the outset” (Asbee 55). Indeed, at this novel’s end, the final marriage 
possibility (between the narrator and his identity) is also subverted. At the end of such 
conventional works, “[t]he main character is usually older and wiser, if nothing else, and 
these are precisely what O’Brien’s protagonist is not” (55). In this case, the parody o f the 
Bildungsroman that Hopper suggests is at work in the novel is completed, and the comic 
need for a “change o f heart on the part of those who have been obstructing the comic 
resolution” (Frye 133) is undermined — that is, there can be no change on the narrator’s 
part if he is condemned to repeat a specific pattern for the rest of his existence. This 
ending, then, can also suggest a refutation of dialogism — the circular structure of the 
novel provides a negation of any form of dialogical synthesis, since all the disruption 
generated throughout the novel is fated to be bom yet again.
But what about the fact that a sort of common sense and logical order is restored 
to the reader when it is revealed that the narrator has been dead throughout the novel, and
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the mysterious goings on possibly accounted for by his not being in the corporeal world? 
Is the representation of a plural reality in The Third Policeman finally accounted for by 
the context of the narrator and story being placed in the afterlife and not on earth? These 
strange occurrences might not be possible in our world after-all, but surely could be so in 
the afterlife. O’Brien himself suggested that “[w]hen you are writing about the world of 
the dead — and the damned — where none o f the rules and laws (not even the law of 
gravity) holds good, there is any amount of scope for back-chat and funny cracks” {The 
Third Policeman 207). This problem may be answered in ontological terms; that is, by 
suggesting that no resolving of ontologies into one is possible in The Third Policeman, 
but that every attempt to do so leatk only to a proliferation of more levels, and, if  as 
Clissmann suggests, the narrator is being punished for committing a crime for de Selby 
and this hell conforms to de Selby’s theories themselves, then this hell is a symbolic 
existence reserved for those who try to pin things down to an ultimate truth or ontological 
level. Booker says that
O’Brien’s text shows that the Enlightenment project of gaining a complete 
understanding and domination of nature through the resources o f human 
reason is a futile one. The Third Policeman reflects many of the concepts 
and concerns of modem physics and philosophy, though its main force 
may be to parody the attempts of such human endeavours to grasp a reality 
that is unknowable. (64)
The narrator’s hell is thus an expression of the “true” plural nature of “reality” and a 
condemnation of him to its confusion — the very state such individuals try to deny and
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solve away. Again, The Third Policeman seems darker than At Swim-Two-Birds, where 
the status quo is merely exposed as sterile, not condemned to Hell.
The ultimate joke in this “fascinating” yet certainly dark “pancake” may be that, 
behind all the masks, Brian O’Nolan saves himself from a fate similar to that of the 
narrator of his novel. Indeed, Booker cautions “that The Third Policeman, like all of 
O’Brien’s work, contains a great deal of self-parody as well” and “O’Brien thus avoids 
setting up his own work as substitute for the authorities undermined in his book” (64).
The Third Policeman is a novel about pure, unencumbered creation that goes on, like the 
narrator and his tale, for eternity.
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Chapter Four: On Piss and Vomit
Many critics seem to mistake The Hard Life for a very straightforward comic 
work — and perhaps understandably so, since the novel lacks the blatant “signposts” 
evident in At Swim-Two-Birds, and even the less-obvious nods present in The Third 
Policeman. But despite the fact that this novel puts forward the most traditional, linear 
narrative and contains the least foregrounding of the three I am studying. The Hard Life 
still contains potent metafictional jolts that underline the ways in which the novel form is 
certainly a “sham.” This novel is also charged with the energy of a comic incongruity 
generated both by the collision o f a number o f competing discourses and by a 
juxtaposition of the sacred and the sacrilegious that represents a clash between all that is 
comic and all that seeks to topple the authority of that type of discourse. The subversion 
o f comic discourse here, however, is not quite as dark as in The Third Policeman.
The story-line in The Hard Life is unremarkable — it involves the narrator,
Finbarr, and his brother, Manus, both orphans who come to live with a buffoon o f a 
relative named Mr. Collopy and his daughter, Annie. Finbarr’s role in the action is 
largely passive; he simply relates the humorous exploits of his brother’s get-rich-quick 
schemes; the various theological disputes that occur between Collopy and Father Fahrt; 
and Collopy’s life-long cause (the true details of which are hidden from the reader for 
most of the book) that ends in disaster. But upon closer examination, Finbarr takes on a 
much more significant role, for while he is not involved in much of the action itself, 
while he experiences no comic difficulties in his own life, all the action within the novel
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is channelled to the reader through Finbarr, making him representative o f the 
machinations of comic discourse.
But such a banal narrative as The Hard Life contains has lead critics to dismiss the 
novel as somewhat less than powerful and subversive. Clissmann suggests that it 
“presents O’Brien’s most normal picture of reality” and shows an “increasing tendency to 
use pedantry as a comic device to ‘pad out’ his books with a large amount of factual 
detail” (272). She also dismisses the novel for its presenting “too one-sided a vision of 
squalid reality” — a notion which seems ironic in the context of ridiculous characters with 
blatantly ludicrous names like “Father Fahrt,” and the unstable vision of “reality” The 
Hard Life actually suggests.
Tess Hurson contends that Hard Life...\s...\h& least appealing of O’Brien’s 
works” (119) and that it “suffers not only from the absence of an intrinsically interesting 
plot, but from the absence of any compensatory order o f discourse” (122). This absence 
of order may certainly exist in The Hard Life, for the comic discourse that the humorous 
aspects of the novel are part and parcel o f is ultimately imdermined here as well. But 1 
would not suggest that the book necessarily suffers for it — rather, O’Brien’s work seems 
to thrive as it moves towards such an “absence” of authoritative, stable discourse.
Shea takes a more in-depth approach to this novel and the complex possibilities 
within it. He asserts that “7%e Hard Life masquerades as a tame, straightforward novel 
even as it explores how discourses collapse” (142), and that “[tjhrough its pose as 
realistic fiction...[it] rebukes the reader looking for authenticity in the novel” (151). In 
Shea’s terms, it is easy to identify aspects of entropie parody at work within The Hard
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Life. He suggests that, here,
[O’Brien] works with readily recognized fictional patterns in order to 
dismantle them. The text suggests that the mimetic novel — which 
attempts to simulate our daily world even as it rivals and augments it — is 
most inauthentic precisely when readers accept it as ‘realistic.’ (143)
Thus is “‘[n]arrative’...in fact faked, with The Hard Life exposing itself as a series of 
scenes loosely linked by cardboard character development” (Shea 143).
In this subversive context, it is important that The Hard Life is structured as a sort 
of memoir (a form of literature generally seen as containing an authoritative account of 
something):
As a conscious narrator [Finbarr] can describe, judge and comment on 
things from an emotionally uninvolved distance. This accounts for the 
finished nature of the judgements, for the clarity of the synthesis of 
experience, for the coherence of the pattern. (Clissmann 274)
But despite Hurson’s assertion that “[tjhere are no indications, no clues, that might 
provoke the reader into viewing the characters as fictions within fictions” and that 
“Finbarr is...only too reliable” (125), 1 would argue that the reader is actually introduced 
into this story on a rather pointed metafictional note — though one that is offered to the 
reader in a subtle marmer that may prevent its implications from being immediately 
realized. This metafictional context is first suggested when Finbarr, in describing a 
conversation between himself and Manus (whom he generally refers to as “the brother”), 
concludes “[tjhat’s merely my recollection of the silly sort of conversation we had.
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Probably it is all wrong” (12). This metafictional “wink,” as opposed to a “signpost,” is 
repeated later in the novel, when Finbarr admits that
[tjhere is something misleading but not dishonest in this portrait o f Mr. 
Collopy. It cannot be truly my impression of him when I first saw him but 
rather a synthesis o f all the thoughts and experiences 1 had of him over the 
years, a huge look backwards. (16)
Here, O’Brien demonstrates that any story-telling/story-recounting venture carmot 
represent an accurate “reality” — even a work of “non-fiction” involves ordering and 
becomes, thus, a discourse fraught with invention. Consequently, The Hard Life seems to 
present a fiction within a fiction after-all: Finbarr, a fictional character, admits the 
fictional aspects o f his memoir.
Whereas the narrator of The Third Policeman tries to use “[w]ords...to mediate an 
existence” (Shea 136), Finbarr is upfiront about how false is the existence he gives the 
reader. Hurson may be concerned that “7%e Hard Life suffers, however deliberately, 
firom the lack of authorial interference, and the price of the author’s withdrawal is a novel 
with no meaning, no pattern,” one that “refuses fictionality” (120), but 1 would suggests 
that, obviously, there is much interference and ontological tweaking involved in this 
novel — if not from O’Brien directly, then certainly on the part o f his narrator. The 
purpose of such interference is to, as O’Neill might say, “decentre the discourse.” If  in 
The Hard Life, “[tjhere is no attempf as there is in ̂  Portrait o f  the Artist, to illustrate 
the developing consciousness and linguistic power of the child” and so “Finbarr is telling 
the story when he is much older and makes no attempt to think back to the kind of
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perception and language he would have had as a boy of five,” then it is certainly possible 
to suggest that “Finbarr is...a highly conscious narrator who is telling his story not, like 
Stephen Daedalus, experiencing his life” (Clissmann 273-274). Such a context helps the 
reader recognize that s/he is most definitely reading a foregrounded fiction — reading 
about a character who is, to a large extent, involved in re-constructing his own past.
There are several other instances wherein Finbarr foregrounds fictionality. At one 
point, according to Booker, “[t]he narrator admits that his recollection o f’ his younger life 
“is probably inaccurate (he was only five at the time), and describes the period as a gap in 
his life, ‘a sort o f interregum [s/c], lacuna or hiatus’” (89). In another instance, Finbarr 
ends the description of his familial relation to Collopy with the caveat: “[i]t is seemly, as 
1 have said to give that explanation but 1 cannot pretend to have illuminated the situation 
or made it more reasonable” (20). While this point might not suggest outright 
fictionality, it does certainly show that the story is not a clear representation of a life 
delivered through an unfiltered lens. Here, Finbarr happily decentres his own authority 
over “truth.”
Not surprisingly, Finbarr is a constant, inescapable presence in the scenes he 
describes — though a very subtle one. Most o f the descriptions, for instance, of Collopy 
and Father Fahrt debating on religious topics in Collopy’s kitchen are prefaced by Finbarr 
situating himself within their presence, ostensibly attending to his studies: “The brother 
and myself were at the table, struggling through that wretched homework...Mr. Collopy 
was slumped in his cane armchair...ln an easy chair opposite was Father Kurt Fahrt” (31). 
This context does change near the end of the novel, when Collopy, Father Fahrt and
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Manus travel to Rome without Finbarr: “And so they sailed away. How did they fare? 
That peculiar story was revealed in dispatches I received from the brother, and which I 
now present” (127). As a result o f Manus’s letter within the fiction of Finbarr’s tale, the 
narrator’s distance from “reality” is made greater still and the reader is presented with a 
further nested narrative and another ontological level.
There are a number o f subtle metafictional breadcrumbs scattered throughout the 
novel that underline Finbarr’s literariness. There is his astute, educated observation of a 
dismal, rainy day — it makes him think “of Wordsworth and his wretched ‘Pathetic 
Fallacy’” (58). Later, in a brief conversation between the brothers, Manus comments to 
Finbarr that “I believe that you are a bit of a literary man”; Finbarr responds: “Do you 
mean the prize I got for my piece about Cardinal Newman?”; and Manus replies, “Well, 
that and other things” (149). Both of these examples point to Finbarr’s explicitly literary 
consciousness, and go some distance towards undermining Asbee’s criticism that, as a 
narrator, Finbarr “is...less interesting than his predecessors, being neither a writer nor 
dead” (84). Dead, no. A writer — most certainly.
In the context of narrative space, then, the reader need not imagine Finbarr 
delivering this account verbally to a number of eager listeners as Conrad’s Marlow might, 
but that s/he is receiving his written account. Therefore, this novel, unlike At Swim-Two- 
Birds and The Third Policeman, does not necessarily contain a representation of a pure 
literary consciousness but the tangible product of one. The Hard Life does not give us 
Finbarr’s consciousness in an unfixed stream, but showcases his representation of how 
consciousness orders the details o f one’s existence.
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Similar to At Swim-Two-Birds and The Third Policeman, The Hard Life parodies 
the novel form through a detailed dissection of language. Booker argues that “even the 
ostensibly ‘pedestrian’ style of The Hard Life still shows concern with language of a kind 
that belies the usual picture o f O’Brien as a writer who gradually turned away from the 
reflexive concerns that so centrally inform A t Swim-Two-Birds" (104). O’Brien 
underlines the idea that names are basic units of fiction making when, near the end o f the 
novel, the reader is presented with an illustration o f Collopy’s gravestone, with only his 
surname carved into it (150), and leams that neither Finbarr, Manus, nor Father Fahrt 
know Collopy’s first name (151). Although they subsequently discover that it is 
“Ferdinand” (153), the initial lack draws attention to Collopy’s fictionality. That is, the 
reader takes it for granted that Collopy has a first name but that, for one reason or 
another, it just has not been revealed to him or her, and the name on the gravestone seems 
to be a joking reminder of that fact. Collopy is, first and foremost, a figure in the 
imagination o f this narrator, and until Finbarr divulges Collopy’s first name, he has none.
The fact of the narrator’s name (for, unlike the forces that seem to preside over At 
Swim-Two-Birds and The Third Policeman, this narrator does have a name) is quite 
important itself. This firm identification seems to help establish distance between the 
author and the narrator by rounding out the character of “Finbarr” and marking him as a 
separate entity from “Flann O’Brien” the author. In opposition to the crisis o f identity 
experienced by the narrator o f The Third Policeman, Finbarr’s existence seems grounded 
and thus, in turn, suggests a solid relationship between signifier and signified. This 
stability, though, is deceptive (perhaps made so consciously on O’Brien’s part) since it
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certainly does not infect the rest o f  the novel with notions of definite order and stability.
The linguistic fimction o f names and words is also suggested through Finbarr’s 
relation of the family history:
Mr. Collopy was my mother’s half-brother and was therefore my own half­
uncle. He had married twice. Miss Annie being his daughter by his first 
marriage. Mrs. Crotty was his second wife, but she was never called Mrs. 
Collopy, why 1 cannot say. She may have deliberately retained the name 
of her first husband in loving memory of him or the habit may have grown 
up through the absence o f mind. (19)
Mrs. Crotty’s retention of her previous husband’s surname suggests that names (and, by 
extension, words in general) are quite arbitrary. The name “Crotty” has not necessarily 
been made part of her essential being through the sacrament of marriage — she may have 
just grown used to its being affixed to her, like a piece of cheap jewellery.
The discussions between Collopy and Father Fahrt also emphatically point out the 
arbitrariness of language. Shea suggests that
[t]he novel centres...on the pedantic verbal tennis matches between the 
uncle, Mr. Collopy, and the neighbouring German priest. Father Kurt 
Fahrt, S.J. Their respective ‘pedestrian styles’ compete and interact, 
building networks o f discourse which ironically affirm the absences they 
seek to counter. (143)
These discourses themselves are quite “self-evident shams.” Booker notes that 
[ajlmost all o f the language in The Hard Life is...without the backing of
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any firm conviction. For example, Fahrt’s defenses of Catholicism are just 
as mechanical as Collopy’s attacks. His rejoinders to Collopy’s arguments 
consist largely of empty phrases like ‘You exaggerate,’ ‘Oh...dear,’ ‘I 
wouldn’t say that the story is quite so simple as that,’ and ‘Hold on a 
moment now.’ (93)
Booker also notes that “Father Fahrt’s discourse seems to consist largely of memorized, 
prefabricated arguments and quotations,” and since these “are further undermined by the 
fact that his memory is often unreliable” (93), he also represents the inherent emptiness o f 
language. In these debates,
[e]ach voice displays a prominent, easily recognizable manner of selecting 
and combining words. Collopy’s sound is that of cliche-ridden, 
vituperative ‘Paddy Whack’...[His] moral modest proposals are littered 
with folksy Irish expressions such as ‘pishrogues,’ ‘goraways,’ 
‘looderamawn,’ ‘gobshite,’ and ‘smahan.’ Father Fahrt’s field of 
discourse flaunts the well-known Jesuitical dodge. He deflects Collopy’s 
onslaughts with memorized catechistical responses, banal metaphors, and 
his Order’s own brand of ‘rigorous’ logic. (Shea 145)
These debates between Collopy and Father Fahrt do not really seem intended to be 
productive in any way, for,
[ajlthough the two assume they converse, each ultimately talks to himself, 
trying to assure and invigorate an existence enclosed by claustrophobic 
formulations. Their friendly disputations traverse the same old ground
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wearing, not a path, but a trench which determines the course o f their 
counsel as it walls in their horizons. (Shea 145)
These debates exist as platforms from which two competing discourses can be launched, 
never to be synthesized. Such a failure o f dialogism harkens back to Esty’s criticism of 
At Swim-Two-Birds that I have discussed earlier and is used here by O’Brien to a 
similarly chaotic end.
In fact, in The Hard Life, “[a]ll conununication remains inconclusive and 
functions metaphorically like Mr. Collopy’s ceramic liquor receptacle,” a “crock” or 
‘a squat earthenware container, having an ear on each side, in which 
Kilbeggan Distillery marketed its wares. The Irish words for whiskey — 
Uisge Beatha — were burnt into its face. This vessel was, of course, 
opaque and therefore mysterious; one could not tell how empty or full it 
was, nor how much Mr. Collopy had been drinking.’ (Shea 146-147).
Shea says that “[cjonversations here amount to comic ‘crocks’ — impaired, mysterious, 
opaque vessels which hide an interesting emptiness inimical to words” (147). If words, 
the basic building materials of a novel, can be placed in such a context, then the stability 
of all novels is called into question here.
The Hard Life's “rudimentary plot” itself “is used primarily by O’Brien as a 
framework within which to conduct various explorations of the use of language” (Booker 
86)and
is ...an extended allusion to Joyce, being based on a Mr. Collopy’s 
dedication to his plan to institute a series of public restrooms for women in
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Dublin. This plan derives itself in an obvious way from Leopold Bloom’s 
remark as he passes a public urinal for men in Ulysses that there ‘[ojught 
to be places for women.’ (Booker 86)
In this sense. The Hard Life shows that words can be rabid generators of meaning as well 
as cheap baubles. Here, the reader sees a single word generating a whole new literary 
world — an aspect that also underlines the lack o f individual authority a given work of 
literature might have.
An interesting metacomical moment is set within these disputations — a scene 
involving Collopy, Father Fahrt and the “truth.” Collopy claims that he, himself, 
“revere[s] truth” and argues that Fahrt “is fond o f truth, too, provided it is the truth you 
like, the truth that suits your book” (78). Fahrt believes that “[t]ruth is truth” (78), and 
thus represents ontological certainty while Collopy, even if he does not mean to do so, 
suggests the idea o f a plural reality here. Shea points out that “[t]he context and 
comportment of learned disputation is wonderfully deflated by imaginative, gratuitous 
details” that Collopy employs, “such as ‘a woman without a knickers,’ ‘red hot nails,’ and 
‘unfortunate Jewmen’” (145). He suggests that
[t]he use o f these particulars (cliches and barely signifying) seems to free 
Collopy from any stultifying adherence to fact. And his frenetic 
irreverence progressively builds on itself with cadences like ‘something o f 
the kind’ generating deferential ambiguities like ‘up where-you-know.’ 
(145)
The massive increase in weight that Collopy later suffers due to a
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misinterpretation of language is also symbolically representative o f the chaotic nature of 
both language and reality, suggesting that neither is a stable authority, and thus can 
meaning be generated on and on ad infinitum. That is. The Hard Life suggests a further, 
more dangerous trait of language. The state of flux that characterizes language can make 
words into potentially lethal weapons, as is evidenced by Collopy’s weight gain. This 
health problem has its roots in the note that Manus sends along with the “Gravid Water” 
that is supposed to cure Collopy’s arthritis. In it, he instructs Finbarr that the proper 
“[d]ose” is “one t-spoonful three times daily after meals” (113). Finbarr interprets the 
sign to mean “tablespoon” (117) and as a result of receiving an over-dose of a medicine 
that, had it been “properly administered” should have caused “a gradual and controlled 
increase in weight and thus [caused] a redevelopment of the rheumatoid joints by reason 
o f the superior weight and the increased work they would have to do” (119), Collopy 
grows quite obese quite quickly. In a grotesquely comic scene near the end of the novel, 
Collopy crashes through the upper level of a concert hall to his death (143). This basic 
comic example of a confusion of signifiers that leads to tragic consequences reveals the 
arbitrariness of language and its potential for causing chaos.
In addition to that suggested by the Collopy/Fahrt debates, a similar dissection of 
language occurs in Manus’s “academy,” which “is designed to effect a complete 
commodification of knowledge, reducing it to a mere series o f facts that can be mass- 
marketed in convenient packages” (Booker 94-95) and is based around a series of pseudo­
treatises that are, themselves, parodies. Manus’s first book, titled “THE HIGH WIRE” 
(The Hard Life 46), is ostensibly about “wire-walking” (48) and contains simply
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“straightforward” (48) instructions, but also a convoluted “Forward.” Booker finds that a 
passage such as “Tt were folly to asseverate that periastral peripatesis on the aes ductile, 
or wire, is destitute of profound peril not only to sundry membra, or limbs, but to the back 
and veriest life itself” is given “in an academic language that is preposterously ‘high’” 
(95). Of Manus’s prose, Finbarr notes that “I do not know what it means and I have no 
doubt whatever that the brother’s ‘clients’ will not know either” (The Hard Life 47-48) — 
and, according to Booker, it is “no wonder, because this stilted discourse means virtually 
nothing” (95). Language is exposed as quite useless with regards to establishing a firm 
level of reality.
The Hard Life is also characterized by a powerful example of comic incongruity 
generated by the scatological comedy around which much of Collopy’s quest (and much 
o f the other action) is based. Such incongruity helps contextualize this “comedy of 
narration” into a metacomedy.
While Hopper refers to the novel’s “schoolboyish vulgarity” being “largely a 
consequence of O’Brien’s hidden agenda — an attempt to provoke the Censorship Board 
into slapping a ban on the book, thus earning him (he hoped) a certain regenerative 
notoriety” (50), such “vulgarity,” I would argue, is quite important in creating metacomic 
incongruity within the novel. That “0 ’Brien...wrote to congratulate the publisher on its 
production of the book,” saying, ‘“ [i]t is precisely right that elegance should attach to a 
volume which contains a treatise on piss and vomit’” (Asbee 84) underlines O’Brien’s 
intentions to create a mix of the foul and the holy. Such a juxtaposition attacks the 
authority of the Church and, by extension, undermines the sanitized, Christian ending of
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traditional comedies that showcase a “renewing power” that “lifts us into a higher world 
and separates that world from the world of the comic action itself’ (Frye 133). O’Brien’s 
“vulgarity” keeps things in this world.
Clissmann would agree that there is an example of comic incongruity working 
here. She asserts that
[t]o a great extent, the comedy of The Hard Life stems from its 
concentration on the basic functions of man set side by side with his 
intellectual pretensions...ln the book, O’Brien illustrates the same view of 
man as an ugly and ludicrous animal as had Swift. This is clear in the 
presentation of Father Fahrt, the subtle Jesuit, a casuist, a philosopher who 
bears (in English, at least,) a ridiculous name and who is first seen 
scratching wildly at various sections of his anatomy. (280)
Similarly, Booker suggests that incongruity manifests itself in The Hard Life in the way 
in which
Collopy and his confederates in this project continually refer to their object 
of concern by such euphemisms as ‘it’ or ‘ what-you-know.’ This satire is 
not unimportant because it suggests that an unrealistic disgust with the 
physical realities o f life makes conditions in Dublin less pleasant, 
especially for women. It is also highly ironic, given that the text is laced 
with scatological references, despite the daintiness with which the central 
topic of women’s urination is avoided. It is, in short, silly to attempt to 
deny that such physical functions cease to exist because all o f us
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participate in them every day o f our lives. (88)
For Booker, “'The Hard Life frequently effects that kind o f juxtaposition of the ‘low’ and 
the ‘high’ that is the central characteristic of the Menippean carnival” and 
contains“mixtures of disparate discourses” that “may be the very multiplicity of voices in 
the text that leads Clissmann to find that [the novel] lacks coherence” (101). In Booker’s 
opinion, the novel “consistently effects a Rabelaisian juxtaposition of excremental 
imagery with presumably lofty spiritual ideas” (102) — though this juxtaposition will 
work to create an ending not entirely sympathetic with a Menippean Satire. Indeed, we 
do not see a synthesis of voices but a violent explosion of them by the novel’s final, 
vulgar image.
This juxtaposition runs rampant throughout the novel, even at the level of 
character. Booker suggests that
O’Brien’s subtle association of the church with ‘filth’ inheres particularly 
in his depiction of Father Fahrt, an ambassador of spirituality who is 
frequently associated in The Hard Life with the physical. When we first 
meet Fahrt he is scratching frantically at his back due to an apparent attack 
of psoriasis. And later we find Fahrt indulging in the physical pleasures o f 
both tobacco and alcohol. (102)
Comic incongruity and metacomic disorder are also apparent in The Hard Life in a 
version of the literary theory propounded by the narrator of At Swim-Two-Birds — that 
“[t]he entire corpus of existing literature should be regarded as a limbo from which 
discerning authors could draw their characters as required...The modem novel should be
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largely a work of reference” (At Swim-Two-Birds 33). This idea manifests itself in The 
Hard Life in Manus’s shady, pseudo-literary endeavours. Manus, Finbarr reports, “was 
trying to flood Britain with a treatise on cage-birds, published by the Simplex Nature 
Press, which also issued a Guide to Gardening, both works obviously composed of 
material looted from books in the National Library” (57-58). Finbarr goes so far as to 
refer to “the National Library” as Manus’s “private mine” (69).
Manus’s own designs become more ambitious and, at a symbolic level, his 
attempts to control a variety of incongruous discourses become more ambitious as well.
In an effort to further his educational empire, he moves to London to start up the 
“LONDON UNIVERSITY ACADEMY” that teaches everything from “Boxing” to 
“Astronomy” to “Sheep Farming” (100) with an over-reaching, specific goal; that is, 
“aim[ing] at the mass production of knowledge, human accomplishment and civilization” 
and fighting “ignorance and non-education, or mis-education” (102). Manus, by trying to 
subsume all o f these incongruous materials into one “Academy,” into one fat discourse 
of his own making and control, represents other authorities which O’Brien has targeted, 
including the symbolic function of marriage in comic discourse.
Hurson agrees that Manus’s technique seems to resemble that put forth by the 
narrator in O’Brien’s earlier novel (126), but also feels that va. At Swim-Two-Birds
the borrowings are organised into an original design which estranges them 
or, as Pound would say, makes them ‘new.’ The excerpts from the 
Conspectus o f Arts and Natural Sciences are kept short for the very good 
reason that they are informative rather than imaginative and do not offer
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any sustained potential to the creative imagination. (126)
She asserts that “Manus goes no further than this informative sort o f discourse and the 
curriculum of the Academy and the general ingenuity of his scams is [s/c] 
correspondingly impoverished” (126). But that outcome may simply work to underline 
the idea that one cannot successfully attempt to subsume a variety of discourses into one 
profound “truth,” and that this Academy is as useless at maintaining a single, viable, 
stable authority as, for example, any literary form. The Academy, therefore, represents 
both the meaning-generating power of language as well as a chaos of voices over a 
chorus.
Still, Hurson feels that, with regards to Manus,
O’Brien might have drawn his character from a more sharply satirical 
angle, or with greater psychological depth. He might have filtered a 
stream of consciousness through him, or employed his more characteristic 
blend of the homely and the outrageous. As it is, Manus is remote without 
being truly distanced, rapacious without being truly villainous, a kind of 
local ‘chance’, a minor figure, perhaps only too realistic to satisfy any set 
of fictional conventions. (126)
But I would argue that much o f the point of The Hard Life is that Manus has not been 
created in any o f these ways. He works quite nicely as an undermined authority figure 
and spouter of useless discourse whose presence points to the subversion of comic 
reconciliation we find at the end o f the novel.
The ending of The Hard Life, in fact, features quite a brash denial of comic
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discourse. When Manus puts it to Finbarr that “[i]n my opinion...half your own battle 
was won if you decided to settle down. Tell me this much: have you ever had wish for 
Annie?” (156), Finbarr answers by finishing his whiskey and then going to the washroom 
where “everything inside [him] came up in a tidal surge of vomit” (157).
Hurson suggests that at the end of the novel, we find “a...mismatching between 
what we might call cause and effect” — that Finbarr’s “reaction...seems...quite out of 
proportion to the immediate provocation” (124). However, this ending does seem 
entirely appropriate since it provides an example of the incongruous juxtaposition o f filth 
and holiness writ throughout the novel: it works as a blatant rejection o f everything that 
the ending of a traditional comedy should suggest to maintain comic discourse. 
Furthermore, this vomitous pseudo-conclusion also represents Finbarr’s inability to 
contain all the discourses and worlds he tries to work into his tale. Whereas Collopy 
symbolically reacts to the power of language by bloating with its products, Finbarr 
(unable to contain it or, perhaps, knowing that to try to contain it is rather unhealthy) 
reacts by exploding. He neither demonstrates an ability to synthesize voices nor aligns 
positive, regenerative imagery with the act of marriage. This scene also recalls At Swim- 
Two-Birds in that, here, O’Brien underlines the artificiality of perfunctory comic 
conclusions — the blatantly simplistic ending of a character inheriting money and riding 
off into the sunset of a new marriage is undermined by Finbarr’s defiance of Manus’s 
suggestion.
Manus proposes this marriage in the first place, Booker suggests, out of economic 
concerns — “when he learns that Annie will have a comfortable regular income as a result
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of her inheritance from the recently deceased Collopy” Manus “suggests that perhaps 
Finbarr should consider marrying Annie as a source o f cash” (Booker 96). Booker is 
unsure “whether the strength of [Finbarr’s] reaction results from a revulsion at Manus’s 
unscrupulous suggestion or from a horror at the thought o f being married to Annie or 
both” (96). Of Annie herself, Booker notes that
[a]ny marriage she makes is unlikely to bring her genuine frilfrlment, as 
marriage — like other potential sources of spiritual and emotional growth 
in the Dublin of The Hard Life — is a degraded institution that echoes the 
degraded condition o f Irish life in general. (98)
Booker obviously feels that O’Brien is undermining marriage, since he asserts that 
“[f]or...O’Brien, the impossibility o f successful creative self-constitution through 
marriage is only one aspect of the general inability o f the citizens of Dublin to develop 
positive and dynamic images of themselves” and that, in this representation of Ireland, 
the reader finds a nation in which “parents are either missing or ineffectual, government 
authorities are corrupt and incompetent, the church is selfish and indifferent” (99).
In painting such a bleak picture, O’Brien’s novel seems very much involved in an 
Irish tradition that regards marriage and reproduction as not the most attractive subjects. 
Vivien Mercier, in discussing how “macabre humour” is used in Irish literature, suggests 
that it becomes “a defence mechanism against the fear of death” (76). According to 
Mercier, such humour “seems a very imperfect mechanism in the death-obsessed work of 
Samuel Beckett” but “[o]n the other hand [feels] that [Beckett’s] grotesque humour often 
fully bears out [her] theory that such humour ‘serves as a defence mechanism against the
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holy dread with which we face the mysteries o f reproduction’” (76). She suggests that, in 
some o f Beckett’s writing, “one laughs in self-defence against the uneasy suspicion that 
sex has betrayed everyone into at least remotely comparable absurdities. Much of Joyce’s 
humour at the expense of sex, particularly in Ulysses, has exactly the same effect” (77). 
Furthermore, she asserts that
[w]hen these absurdities are found tolerable at all by Irishmen, they are 
found so primarily because they serve that greater end, the perpetuation of 
the human race. But to a number of Irish Manicheans — including Beckett, 
Swift, and Shaw — they are not tolerable. Irish lovers live in constant 
terror of being laughed at, and, if it be true that the Irish in Ireland are a 
vanishing race, at least part o f the blame must lie with their national sense 
of the grotesque. (77)
Perhaps O’Brien (though not necessarily a Manichean) can be added to that list, for in 
The Hard Life, one of the most (traditionally) sacred rituals of humankind is linked with 
some of the foulest, and the progenitive imagery that could be associated with a story- 
concluding marriage is noticeably absent. However, I have argued that O’Brien has 
created this link for symbolic reasons, not necessarily because he has difficulties with 
sexuality. Furthermore, his humour here is certainly not as dark or “macabre” as in The 
Third Policeman.
What The Hard Life delivers is a mocking of the holiness and regenerative power 
o f marriage found in comic discourse. Here, as in his other works, reconciliation is 
subsumed to the perpetuation of O’Brien’s humorously defiant vision of “reality.” But
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although The Hard Life suggests what a sham is the consciousness aspired to by 
traditional comic discourse, such traditions are not condemned to hell here; merely 
reduced to the level of “piss and vomit.”
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Conclusion
Throughout this thesis, I have attempted to draw comparisons between 
metafiction and comedy within the context o f Flann O’Brien’s At Swim-Two-Birds, The 
Third Policeman, and The Hard Life. While comic discourse, by its mere existence, 
inevitably produces both a specific world divorced from what we normally view as 
“reality,” and literary works fiill of disruptive laughter, O’Brien’s metafictional comedies 
draw on and push these details to their limits, undermining the easily understandable 
reality that conventional comic reconciliation attempts to resolve disruption into.
O’Brien’s works can be discussed in the terms one of his own narrators suggests: 
that “a satisfactory novel should be a self-evident sham to which the reader could regulate 
at will the degree of his credulity” {At Swim-Two-Birds 33). Metafictions expose the 
mechanics o f the story-telling process to reveal the artistic means by which one creates 
characters and narrative substance, as well as the means by which an author attempts to 
control those characters and that substance — and, ultimately, control reader reaction and 
interpretation as well. Within a comic context, metafictional techniques both underscore 
the desperate lengths authors go to in an effort to control meaning, and suggest how 
useless those measures are in the first place. The purpose of O’Brien’s metafictional 
comedies is not necessarily to comment on social aspects o f the sacrament of marriage 
but to show how shambolic is the ultimate artistic aim o f comic discourse — that is, he 
underlines how the suggestion of stability in both the chaotic world of the comedy and in 
our plural reality at large is a nice but rather naive concept. O’Brien, to put it bluntly.
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makes a joke of comedy itself. Comedy, traditionally, includes the notion that an 
absolute sense can be made o f life, despite the paradoxical disorder wrought through the 
fabric of its discourse by its own humour-generating mechanisms. O’Brien’s laughter, 
however, has no sense o f  comfort tied to it, and largely means dislocation, not 
reassurance. While traditional comic discourse is both subversive as well as conservative 
— seeking to regenerate, but not to overthrow — O’Brien’s novels merely overthrow. 
Furthermore, as some o f the critics I have cited suggest, he does not seek to build a new 
empire in the ruins of an old one. Instead, in the words of McHale, he shows 
“how...postmodernist fiction” represents the “pluralistic ontological landscape” (39) 
evident in twentieth-century life. McHale says that “it is precisely by foregrounding the 
skeleton of layers...that postmodernist fiction achieves its aesthetic effects and sustains 
interest, in the process modelling the complex ontological landscape of our experience” 
(39). In such a context, the positive, stable views of comic discourse seem blissfully 
simplistic.
But, as I have discussed in an earlier chapter, one might want to suggest that a 
new paradigm could be presented by O’Brien’s comedies — a dialogic way of 
comprehending “the complex ontological landscape of our experience.” That is, one 
could suggest that the “marriage” in an O’Brien comedy is a synthesis o f a variety of 
voices, a chorus of them. However, as I have also previously suggested, O’Brien defies 
even that possibility — and in a variety of ways firom novel to novel.
If O’Brien’s novels present an “entropie parody” of a traditional comedy and 
reveal the “sham” that is comic discourse, the degree of the “sham” and the
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foregrounding of entropie parody differ amongst the three novels I have discussed. At 
Swim-Two-Birds is O’Brien’s most outrageous novel — the work in which “metacomic” 
means the running o f traditional comic discourse through its own disruptive processes 
and not allowing that disruption to ebb and “marry” itself out of existence via a 
representation of simple, one-dimensional portrait of reality. Here, we have a comic 
vision that is subversive and suggestive of chaos but perhaps more playful than pointedly 
nihilistic. In The Third Policeman, the reader ultimately sees fiction and comedy run 
against much the same metacomic sword as in .4/ Swim-Two-Birds, but without the 
metafictional aspect tearing at “reality” from page one. ' But in The Third Policeman, the 
chaos is more sinister attack than playful brawl. The metafictional aspects are even less 
foregrounded in The Hard Life, the entropie parody harder to discover and seems, in fact, 
to have been left buried within the novel’s pages by critics unwilling to turn over the few 
stones necessary to unearth them. Nonetheless, authority is subverted in The Hard Life — 
where Finbarr himself gives full evidence of the “sham” he is about to perpetrate. This 
novel, however, is characterized by neither the dark terms of The Third Policeman nor the 
more playful sense o ïA t Swim-Two-Birds, a novel more focused on mere subversion than 
outright condemnation. In The Hard Life, O’Brien employs a brand of toilet humour that, 
as cheap as it may seem, certainly works in the context of the specific authorities he is 
attempting to undermine.
It can be difficult to justify an academic treatment o f Flann O’Brien, as his works 
suggest an enjoyment in taking the piss out o f the academic world and out o f those who 
try to dissect things, whether they are works of literature or scientific phenomena, etc.
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Also, matters tend to get tricky in a postmodern paradigm since, if one climbs back up the 
ontological chain, “Brian O’Nolan” himself may not have believed in such a chaotic 
reality as his novels suggest. Indeed, Cronin suggests that “O’Nolan was bom a Catholic 
and he remained one throughout his life” (114). Cronin feels that “[i]f [O’Nolan] had 
any doubts about the faith in which he was brought up, they were on Manichean 
grounds”; that is, “somehow, perhaps the balance of good and evil in the universe as we 
know it had been disturbed in favour of evil” (114). Cronin asserts that “[o]ne of the 
most remarkable things about Brian O’Nolan’s writing is the way this view of the 
dominance of evil coincides with and reinforces the innate nihilism of the comic vision” 
(115) — though it seems as though Cronin himself is getting at something more like a 
metacomic vision here than the traditional “comic vision.”
Still, the question can be raised: Should these novels be read within an explicitly 
moral framework? I think it is quite easy to argue against the necessity of such a reading, 
for, even if “Brian O’Nolan” was a committed Catholic (though a Catholic whose “own 
brand of Catholicism” contained “dark deterministic tendencies” (Cronin 190)), with all 
the persona- and position-shifting he undertakes, there is no reason to believe that “Flann 
O’Brien” should be regarded as a mouthpiece for O’Nolan’s supposed morality. In view 
of O’Nolan’s use o f many masks and facades, he more than willingly invites such a 
reading. The vision in these novels is so shifting, so playfully undermining when it 
comes to traditional concepts of language, narrative, authority and literature in general 
that one cannot help but find more than small traces of postmodernist aspects in his work. 
Therefore, and despite what the author might have wanted, those involved in the
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dissection of literature will find such possibilities — be they offered as mere literary 
games or not — quite irresistibly tantalizing. As much as he might scorn them, O’Nolan’s 
novels give academics plenty of substance to play with.
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